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I. INTRODUCTION
German doctors have diagnosed herzinsuffizienz-an insufficient
heart- a disease that in France is believed not to exist.1 French medical logic is
Cartesian.2 From a few basic assumptions, it reasons to complex conclusions.3
British medical logic is cautiously empirical. Without solid evidence that a
certain treatment produces good results and no troubling side-effects, British
doctors might prefer to do nothing.4 American doctors are aggressively
technological, instinctively ordering tests and prescribing treatments that can be
staggeringly expensive and sometimes turn out to be dangerous.
Sometimes you can be cured of a disease by leaving a country where it
is medically popular, although in the country you enter you might acquire a new
disease that is medically popular there but disfavored in the country you left.6
You might have both diseases or only one or none at all. Science and the human
body are not different from one country to the next. The differences are in
medical culture.
To see similar phenomena at work in law-making, compare below the
ways legislation in three countries defines degrees of homicide.7 Illinois has a
typical American homicide statute and accordingly provides the U.S. example in
the comparison. The complete Illinois enactment is closest to the average size,
based on word count, among the seven most populous American states' homicide
statutes. The seven-state average is 3338 words. The Illinois statute has 3281.
The others are California, 7002 words; New York, 5234; Ohio, 3703; Florida,
I LYNN PAYER, MEDICINE & CULTURE: VARIETIES OF TREATMENT IN THE UNITED STATES,
ENGLAND, WEST GERMANY, AND FRANCE 74-75, 79-85 (1988).
2 Id. at 38.
3 Id. at 37-39.
4 Id. at 28, 102-104, 108-111; T.R. REID, THE HEALING OF AMERICA: A GLOBAL QUEST FOR
BETTER, CHEAPER, AND FAIRER HEALTH CARE 104-25 (2009).
5 See, e.g., ELIZABETH H. BRADLEY & LAUREN A. TAYLOR, THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE
PARADOX: WHY SPENDING MORE IS GETTING Us LESS (2013); SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE LAWS
OF MEDICINE: FIELD NOTES FROM AN UNCERTAIN SCIENCE (2015); VINAYAK K. PRASAD & ADAM S.
CIFU, ENDING MEDICAL REVERSAL: IMPROVING OUTCOMES, SAVING LIVES (2015); H. GILBERT
WELCH, LESS MEDICINE, MORE HEALTH: 7 ASSUMPTIONS THAT DRIVE Too MUCH MEDICAL CARE
(2015).
6 PAYER, supra note 1, at 24-25.
7 Quotations from the Code p~nal are from Tomlinson's translation: THE FRENCH PENAL
CODE OF 1994 AS AMENDED AS OF JANUARY 1, 1999, at 94-96 (Edward A. Tomlinson trans., 1999)
[hereinafter Tomlinson]. Code civil quotations later in this Article are from Crabb's translation:
THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE (John H. Crabb, trans. rev. ed. 1995) [hereinafter Crabb]. Regarding the
Swedish translations, see infra note 76. Wary of the French saying that to translate is to betray, I
frequently include in text or footnotes wording in the original language.
[Vol. 119
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2255; Pennsylvania, 1158; and laconic Texas, secure in the knowledge that its
populace naturally understands homicide, 735 words.8
France9
Art. 221-1. The willful




Art. 221-6. Causing the
death of another by
carelessness, imprudence,
inattention, negligence, or the
non-observance of an
obligation of safety or
prudence imposed by law or
regulation, is an unintentional
homicide.
Sweden1°
3:1 One who deprives
another of life is to be sentenced
for murder.
3:2 If the crime referred to in
section 3:1 is considered to be
less grave, in view of the
circumstances that led to the act
or for other reasons,
imprisonment for manslaughter
is to be imposed.
3:7 One who through
carelessness causes another's
death is to be sentenced for
negligent homicide.
Illinoisl"
Sec. 9-1. First degree Murder ....
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful
justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the
acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to
that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause
death to that individual or another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability
of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony
other than second degree murder.
8 Provisions on abortion and on criminal procedure are excluded from these word counts and
the statutory excerpts in the appendices. As a political issue, abortion is treated differently from
one jurisdiction to another. It might be present in one jurisdiction's homicide statute and absent in
another's. Procedural provisions are omitted because those issues might be dealt with in one state's
homicide statute and in another state's criminal procedure statute. Homicide is used here for
comparison because it is the crime most often portrayed in films and on television, and many of
the issues would be familiar to anyone exposed to mass media.
9 The full statute is in Appendix A, infra.
10 The full statute is in Appendix B, infra.
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Sec. 9-2. Second degree murder.
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder
when he or she commits the offense of first degree murder as
defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section 9-1
of this Code and either of the following mitigating factors are
present:
(1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting under a
sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
by the individual killed or another whom the offender endeavors
to kill, but he or she negligently or accidentally causes the death
of the individual killed; or
(2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the
circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or
exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of
this Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an
intense passion in a reasonable person.
Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without
lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts
whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as
are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual,
and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the
cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or
operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in
which case the person commits reckless homicide. A person
commits reckless homicide if he or she unintentionally kills an
individual while driving a vehicle and using an incline in a
roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to
cause the vehicle to become airborne.
Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide.
(a) A person who violates Section 401 of the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act or Section 55 of the
Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act by
unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any
person's death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption,
or ingestion of any amount of that controlled substance, commits
the offense of drug-induced homicide.
To an American, the French and Swedish statutes say so little that it can
be hard to imagine courts being guided by them. But French and Swedish courts
have been guided by statutes like these for centuries. Those courts fill gaps by
[Vol. 119
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reasoning from the statute's words, which is why the words must be drafted with
the utmost care. That cannot happen in an American legislature, which, by
European standards, is chaotic.
To a European, the Illinois statute is gibberish because it uses too many
unnecessary ideas. The French and Swedish statutes illustrate how the same
problems can be solved with fewer concepts-if those concepts are well chosen.
How-and why-are these legislative cultures so different? Discovering
the differences and their causes reveals some surprising truths about ourselves.
One of this Article's key findings is that the primary cause of
incomprehensibility in American statutes is not verbosity and arcane phrasing.
Verbosity-a high ratio of words per concept expressed-and arcane phrasing
are problems. But they are not the main problem. In fact, they are obvious and
fixable, and they distract us from the main problem. A good drafter can rewrite
almost any document for conciseness and clarity. American legislatures employ
skilled drafting professionals who are capable of doing that, but they are
prevented from doing so by the legislative culture explained in this Article.
The main problem is the high ratio of concepts per legislative goal.
Defining degrees of homicide, for example, is a relatively simple legislative goal.
French legal thinking differs fundamentally from Swedish legal thinking. But
each country uses only a handful of concepts to define degrees of homicide.
American legislators, however, insist that difficult subjects can be dealt with only
through complex statutes that address every conceivable issue a legislature can
identify.
Every statutory concept costs money. It creates issues, which must be
decided by someone in government. If the issues are decided in litigation, the
costs expand. If all else is equal, a 50-issue trial costs the parties-and society-
much more money than a 10-issue trial. Every unnecessary statutory concept
wastes social and economic resources.
This is not a question of whether government ought to shrink. It could
hardly be that if France and Sweden are being used for comparison. In some parts
of the American political spectrum, they are assumed, because of government
activism, to be burdened by bureaucratic meddling. Sometimes that might be
accurate, but in surprising ways it is not. If law is well crafted, a strong activist
government can feel like a light one. For example, although Swedes pay
substantially more taxes than Americans do,2 Swedish tax law is so simple-it
includes so few concepts-that a Swede can file an income tax return by sending
a text message. One of the most popular government agencies is the Swedish
equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service. (Part III explains why and how.)
Part II explains French codes through the example of the Code civil,
which is known for its intellectual elegance. It has been considered literature as
well as law. Part III explains a different, almost opposing approach to
12 Henrik Jacobson Kleven, How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?, 28 J. ECON. PERSPS., no.
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codification, based on Swedish pragmatism rather than Cartesian logic, though
it is descended from a kind of literature. Parts II and III together could have been
subtitled legislation as literature.
Part IV compares the fussy, bossy, and excessively conceptualized
legislation of common law countries, particularly the United States, with the
fuzzy legislation of continental Europe. "Continental" and "European" here
mean Europe without Britain and Ireland. No legal system on the continent is
based on common law, and this Article explores differences in legislative culture
between common law countries and other legal systems. France and Sweden are
examples of two European legal traditions. Others, such as Germany, share some
characteristics with France and Sweden but differ substantially in other ways.
Part V compares the American legislative culture and explores the
reasons why American statutes are outliers internationally. Part VI describes an
example of role reversal in which Americans have behaved like Europeans and
Europeans have behaved like Americans. Part VII sums up and concludes.
An American reader must remember that generally the doctrine of stare
decisis is not officially recognized in continental Europe. Precedent, even from
a country's supreme court, is not legally binding authority. Law is to be made
only by democratically elected legislatures or through administrative regulation
under the supervision of legislatively chosen cabinet ministers. In France, Code
civil article 5 prohibits courts from explaining their reasoning through opinions
amenable to use as precedent: "Judges are forbidden to pronounce decisions by
way of general and regulative disposition on cases which are submitted to
them."'13 A decision by the highest French court-the Court de Cassation-
"must consist of a single sentence, with the court as its subject and the disposition
of the appeal as its verb."'14 That single sentence will not contain citations to prior
judicial decisions, will state only the controlling legal rule with little or no
explanation of how the rule is applied to the facts, and will say so little about the
facts that they "can often only be guessed at,"' 5 which limits later opportunities
13 See Crabb, supra note 7, at 2. "II est dfendu auxjuges deprononcerpar voie de disposition
gnrale et r~glementaire sur les causes qui leur sont soumises." CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL
CODE] art. 5 (Fr.). Under article 1351, a judicial decision binds, for the future, only the same parties
seeking the same relief on the same issue. The decision is only res judicata. It is not even collateral
estoppel. Id. art. 1351.
14 Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 94 (1994).
But "opinions of intermediate appellate courts often contain fairly extensive discussions of the
evidence" because "civil juries do not exist in France, [and] judges in the lowest courts must
evaluate the evidence and make findings of fact. The intermediate appellate courts review these
findings de novo." Id. at 98.
15 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 123 (Tony
Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998). Although French precedent is not binding, "[a]ttorneys and court officials
regularly argue or analyze previous decisions for their persuasive value, though courts generally
do not formally acknowledge the precedent in their published judicial decisions." Charles Calleros,
Punitive Damages, Liquidated Damages, and Clauses Pnales in Contract Actions: A Comparative
[Vol. 119
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to analogize or distinguish a precedent. Although "judicial decisions are not a
source of law... the practice is for judges to be influenced by prior decisions' 1 6
because a judge trying to resolve a difficult issue will naturally want to know
how other judges, especially appellate judges, have resolved similar issues.
Precedent is at most persuasive authority, although some of it can be very
persuasive.
II. FRANCE
While writing The Charterhouse, in order to acquire the correct
tone I read every morning two or three pages of the Code civil.
So wrote Stendhal, soon after finishing The Charterhouse ofParma,17 in
an 1840 letter to Balzac describing Stendhal's work habits and thoughts on
style."
A. The Idea of a Code
The French Code civil was widely admired in the 19th century.
Intellectuals praised its "luminous simplicity" and called it "a great and beautiful
piece of work." 19 It was drafted, mostly in 1800, by Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis,
Frangois Denis Tronchet, F6lix-Julien-Jean Bigot de Pr~ameneu, and Jacques de
Maleville. They had been lawyers, judges, and members of various legislatures
during the French Revolution.
During five months, these four wrote most of a code that is largely still
law two centuries later and has been influential throughout much of the world.
In something resembling a writers' retreat, they drafted it at the Chdteau de
Fontainebleau, where their large and impressive working table has remained on
display.20 Although those five months might be a world speed record, this was
not the smallest drafting committee in history. That would have been a committee
Analysis of the American Common Law and the French Civil Code, 32 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 97
(2006).
16 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 48 (1969) (emphasis added).
17 STENDHAL, THE CHARTERHOUSE OF PARMA (C.K. Scott-Moncrieff trans., The New
American Library of World Literature, Inc. 1962).
18 The Charterhouse of Parma is one of the finest 19th century French novels. For the entire
letter, see To THE HAPPY FEW: SELECTED LETTERS OF STENDHAL 371 (Norman Cameron trans.,
1952). This is two great novelists talking shop.
19 JEAN-LOuiS HALPtRIN, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE 61 (Tony Weir trans., 2006) (quoting
Raymond-Th6odore Troplong and Eugene Lerminier).
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of one named David Dudley Field, who drafted five of what Americans call
codes.21 But it took him a lot longer to do it. The Code civil was enacted by 1804
and is unmistakably a product of the Enlightenment's rationalism.
22
The Code civil governs, among other things, citizenship, marriage and
divorce, family relationships, real and personal property, inheritance, contracts,
sales, leases, partnerships, loans, bailments, agency, mortgages, and secured
transactions. It is one of the five grands codes adopted under Napoleon
Bonaparte, the others addressing commerce, civil procedure, criminal law, and
criminal procedure.23 Later legislation-either in petits codes or uncodified
statutes-addresses modern issues such as highways, social security, and labor.24
A code on the French model is meant to be "exclusive, complete, and
enduring.25 Exclusivity means that a code is drafted to be the only source of law
on the subjects it governs. Completeness means that a code resolves all issues
regarding those subjects.
No American legislation is a real code in this sense. American legislation
almost always contains gaps which courts are expected to fill from other law
sources, and even the most famous American "codes"-the Field Codes26 and
the Uniform Commercial Code2 7-- expressly provide for the survival of common
law for every issue not resolved by the statutory language. An American code is
merely a collection of statutes on related subjects. It is rarely, if ever, exclusive
or complete.
Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, the lead Code civil drafter,28 later recalled
that from "the beginning of our meetings we were struck by the view ... that the
great art is to simplify everything while foreseeing everything. To simplify
everything is a work on which one must agree. To foresee everything is an end
21 See infra text accompanying notes 174-89.
22 See RENE DAVID, FRENCH LAW: ITS STRUCTURE, SOURCES, AND METHODOLOGY 12 (1972);
THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO MODERN CIVIL LAW 130-32, 134-38
(1999). From 1807 until after the Second Empire collapsed in 1870, the Code's official alias was
the Code Napoleon. HALPtRIN, supra note 19, at 81, 85.
23 Crabb, Introduction, supra note 20, at xix, xxvii; ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF THE CIVIL
LAW 118 (1981).
24 Crabb, Introduction, supra note 20, at xix, xxvii.
25 THOMAS LUNDMARK, CHARTING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN COMMON AND CIVIL LAW 320 (2012).
26 For example, "[t]he common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant o or inconsistent
with the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule of
decision in all the courts of this State." CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (West 2016).
27 "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of the [Uniform Commercial Code], the
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity to contract,
principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bankruptcy, and
other validating or invalidating cause supplement its provisions." U.C.C. § 1-103(b) (AM. LAW
INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016).
28 Shael Herman, Llewellyn the Civilian: Speculations on the Contribution of Continental
Experience to the Uniform Commercial Code, 56 TULANE L. REV. 1125, 1125 (1982).
[Vol. 119
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which it is impossible to achieve.,29 That certainly turned out to be true with the
law of negligence.
U.S. negligence law took its modem form in the early 20th century in
cases like Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.3" More than a century earlier, in
1800, the Code civil drafters could not have foreseen the world in which
negligence law as we understand it would become necessary. They included only
these two provisions:
Art. 1383
Each one is liable for the damage which he causes not only
by his own act but also by his negligence or imprudence.
Art. 1384
He is liable not only for the damage which he caused by his
own act, but also for that which is caused by act of persons for
whom he is responsible, or by things which he has in his
keeping.31
Article 1383 has not been changed since it was enacted in 1804. During
the 20th century, seven sentences were added to article 1384. One is a cross-
reference. Another involves liability for fires. The other five concern liability of
parents for acts of their children, of teachers for acts of their students, and of
employers for acts of employees. With no other legislative guidance, French
courts had to invent everything else on their own, pretending that they were
interpreting these two articles. "[T]he case law built on Code civil article 1384 is
a highly exceptional phenomenon" that "has been compared to a pyramid built
on a pinhead" and is "more characteristic of the common law than of the
jurisprudence of courts applying a code.
32
To be considered enduring, a code should last at least a century or two,
with tinkering limited to requirements created by societal changes the code
drafters could not have foreseen. The Code civil has been law through the First
Empire, the Bourbon Restoration, the post-Bourbon monarchy, the Second
Republic, the Second Empire, the Third Republic, the Vichy regime, the Fourth
29 JAMES GORDLEY & ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRIVATE LAW: READINGS, CASES, MATERIALS 50 (2009).
30 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
31 Crabb, supra note 7, at 252. Art. 1383: "Chacun est responsable du dommage qu 'il a caus
non seulement par son fait, mais encore par sa ndgligence ou par son imprudence." C. civ. art.
1383 (Fr.). Art. 1384: "On est responsable non seulement du dommage que l'on cause par son
proprefait, mais encore de celui qui est caus6 par lefait des personnes dont on doit r~pondre, ou
des choses que l'on a sous sa garde. "C. ciV. art. 1384 (Fr.).
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Republic, and the present Fifth Republic. It has outlasted nine French
constitutions.33
The 1804 Code had 2,281 articles.34 As of 1995, 1,052 articles had been
amended and 274 new articles had been added. But 1,229 articles-53% of the
1804 Code-had not been changed in any way during 191 years.35 French
"judges have been able, since 1804, to apply the rules of the Code civil to millions
of individual cases... without significant difficulty. 3 6
Because of Napoleon Bonaparte's conquests, codes derived from the
Code civil were adopted in Belgium, the Netherlands, and to some extent in
Italy.37 The Spanish Ctdigo civil, adopted in 1889, borrowed heavily from the
Code civil.38 Romania and Bolivia simply translated the Code civil and enacted
the translation.39 In 1845, the Dominican Republic enacted it without bothering
to translate, and for two generations a Spanish-speaking people were governed
in part by law printed in French, until in 1884 when everyone had had enough
and a Spanish translation was enacted.40 Almost all of Latin America has civil
codes strongly influenced by the Code civil.41 France sold Louisiana to the
United States in 1803. In 1808, Louisiana adopted a civil code based on the Code
civil as well as Spanish sources.42 This is the legislation to which Stanley
Kowalski refers in A Streetcar Named Desire.43
The other classic European civil code is the one in effect in Germany
since 1900. According to Zweigert and Puttfarken,
the German Civil Code, although difficult in some areas to
understand even for a trained lawyer, is a masterpiece of
exactness and clarity in its carefully defined terminology ....
33 DAVID, supra note 22, at 13. The Fifth Republic's constitution, the tenth to which the Code
has been subject, was adopted in 1958.
34 Crabb, Introduction, supra note 20, at xxix. Europeans tend to use the term article for what
we would call a section.
35 Id.
36 Tunc, supra note 32, at 459, 464.
37 HALPtRIN, supra note 19, at 89-93; WATSON, supra note 23, at 121-22.
38 WATSON, supra note 23, at 122-23.
39 Id. at 122.
40 Id. at 124.
41 Crabb, Introduction, supra note 20, at xix, xxiii; HALPtRIN, supra note 19, at 94; WATSON,
supra note 23, at 124-25.
42 WATSON, supra note 23, at 123-24; ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 15, at 116; Rodolfo
Batiza, Sources of the Field Civil Code: The Civil Law Influences on a Common Law Code, 60
TUL. L. REv. 799 (1986).
43 "Have you ever heard of the Napoleonic code?... In the state of Louisiana we have the
Napoleonic code according to which what belongs to the wife belongs to the husband and vice
versa." TENNESSEE WILLIAMS, A STREETCAR NAMED DEsIRE act 1, sc. 2.
[Vol. 119
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The French Code Civil, on the other hand, is easier to understand
and more popular in its language but at times lacks the scientific
precision of the German Code."
Elsewhere, Zweigert and K6tz claim "that the elegant sheen of the
wording in the Code civil is often paid for by a lack of substance," and they quote
another German author as saying that "the famed precision of its expression is
often quite superficial, not that true inner precision which comes from complete
clarity of thought.,45 These claims are untestable, and there is in them a hint of
code envy. It seems implausible that anything, in any language, can both have
"clarity" and be "difficult ... to understand even for a trained lawyer. '46 Perhaps
the French and the Germans have different concepts of verbal precision, each
uncomfortable with the other's version.
How can courts be guided by language as general and open-textured as
that in the Code civil and other European codes? To Europeans, the real question
is how American courts can be guided without travaux pr~paratoires-
preparatory materials. This is more than legislative history. In a parliamentary
system, legislatures have little role in drafting legislation. The drafting-the
choice of both substance and wording-is usually done elsewhere, to be
approved or rejected by the legislature. The drafters, in a ministry or in a
specially designated commission, prepare reports and other documents to explain
the bill to the legislature and the statute, if the bill is enacted, to the courts.
Although ministries in a parliamentary system are units of the executive branch
of government, they are run by ministers answerable to and usually members of
the legislature.
In a system like this, when the legislature enacts a statute, it enacts both
its words and the meaning explained the preparatory materials. Although
American legislative politicking includes the manipulation of legislative history,
that is harder to do with preparatory materials. They are mostly the prelegislative
history, explanations written by drafters before legislators become involved,
although the last part of a set of preparatory materials will often be a report from
a legislative committee, which might have made minor or no changes to a bill
drafted outside the legislature.
In the United States, enactment is merely law-making's beginning, as
courts have decades to finish the legislature's job through interpretation. An
American statute means what the courts say it means, and we do not know that
until the courts tell us. In Europe, a statute's enactment is considered the end of
law-making. If the statute is unclear and the preparatory materials do not clarify
44 Konrad Zweigert & Hans-Jirgen Puttfarken, Civilian Methodology: Statutory
Interpretation-Civilian Style, 44 TuL. L. REV. 704, 707 n.1 1(1970).
45 ZWEIGERT & KOTZ, supra note 15, at 92 (quoting BERNHARD WINDSCHEID, ZUR LEHR DES
CODE NAPOLEON VON DER UNGOLTIGKEIT DER RECHTSGESCHAXTE at v (1847)).
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it, somebody-actually many people-goofed. In Europe, a statute means what
it says or, in case of doubt, what the preparatory materials say it means.
B. The Code Civil as Literature
The Code civil, said the poet Paul Val6ry, is "the greatest book of French
literature."47
Compare the U.S. Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Code civil
on damages, especially the words italicized and underlined:
Restatement (Second)
of Contracts
§ 34 7 Measure ofDamages in General
Subject to the limitations stated in
§§ 350-53, the injured party has a
right to damages based on his
expectation interest as measured by
(a) the loss in the value to him of
the other party's performance caused
by its failure or deficiency, plus
(b) any other loss, including
incidental or consequential loss,
caused by the breach, less
(c) any cost or other loss that he




The damages due to the person
owed the performance are, in
general, the loss which he has
incurred plus the gain of which he
was deprived with the exceptions
and qualifications to be described.49
There is no imagery or sense of human experience in the Restatement's
"loss in the value to him of the other party's performance." At most, we see a
balance sheet with numbers and dollar signs. But in article 1149's "the gain of
which he was deprived," the reader can feel human disappointment.
Often in the Code civil the reader sees in the mind real people
experiencing, well and badly, life's events. Other articles convey rules of law as
philosophy or political theory. Here is an example, on contracts:
47 Id. at 91.
48 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
49 GORDLEY & VON MEHREN, supra note 29, at 536. "Les dommages et int~rts dus au
crdancier sont, en g~ndral, de laperte qu 'il afaite et du gain dont il a t6privg, sauf les exceptions
et modifications ci-aprs." C. civ. art. 1149 (Fr.). Crabb translates au cr6ancier as "to a creditor."
Crabb, supra note 7, at 223. That seems defensible but in this context inaccurate. Article 1149 is
not limited to debt. It applies to all contracts. Gordley and von Mehren translate au crdancier as
"to the person owed the performance"--any performance, not limited to payment of money.








Agreements legally made take the place of law for those
who make them.5°
This is provocative. It confers on contractual parties a capacity to make for
themselves, to govern their transaction, rules that supersede law. The same is true
in U.S. common law. But the Code civil wording dares you to consider how
profound it is that two people, simply by agreeing, can throw much of the law
out the window.
French code drafting is expected to be concise and elegantly simple. The
ideal is to find the smallest number of concepts that resolve all the issues
associated with the legislative subject and to express those concepts in the fewest
words. In poetry as well as code-drafting, compression is one of the
characteristics separating great from mediocre writing.
Legislation can create duties to act, duties not to act, and power or
permission to act. A statute can also make things true by declaring them. In
common law countries, duties and powers permeate statutes; and declarations
play a supporting role. In the Code civil and many other European codes, the
opposite is true. Declarations might vastly outnumber everything else. To an
American, this can seem more like description than law. But it is law because
without these declarations, the rules would not exist. For example:
Art. 552




Ownership of a treasure belongs to him who finds it on his
own land; if the treasure is found on the land of another, it
belongs by moiety to him who discovered it, and by the other
moiety to the owner of the land.
Treasure is anything hidden or buried of which no one can
claim ownership, and which is discovered purely by chance.52
5o Crabb, supra note 7, at 221. "Les conventions kgalementform~es tiennent lieu de loi d ceux
qui les ontfaites. "C. Civ. art. 1134 (Fr.).
51 Crabb, supra note 7, at 128. "La proprit du sol emporte la proprigtg du dessus et du
dessous. "C. cIv. art. 552 (Fr.).
52 Crabb, supra note 7, at 149.
Laproprit d'un tr~sorappartienti celui qui le trouve dans son proprefonds;
si le trsor est trouv6 dans lefonds d'autrui, il appartient pour moiti d celui
qui l'a dkcouvert, etpour l'autre moiti6 aupropriktaire dufonds. Le tr&sor est
toute chose cache ou enfouie sur laquelle personne ne peut justifier sa
proprit9, et qui est d~couverte par lepur effet du hasard.
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Certainly this is "simpler and less legalistic"' 53 than the statutory style to which
we are accustomed. Compare, for example, the following from the federal Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, chosen almost at random from the
U.S. Code:
Every national or international labor organization, except a
federation of national or international labor organizations, and
every local labor organization, and its officers, shall be under a
duty, enforceable at the suit of any bona fide candidate for office
in such labor organization in the district court of the United
States in which such labor organization maintains its principal
office, to comply with all reasonable requests of any candidate
to distribute by mail or otherwise at the candidate's expense
campaign literature in aid of such person's candidacy to all
members in good standing of such labor organization and to
refrain from discrimination in favor of or against any candidate
with respect to the use of lists of members, and whenever such
labor organizations or its officers authorize the distribution by
mail or otherwise to members of campaign literature on behalf
of any candidate or of the labor organization itself with reference
to such election, similar distribution at the request of any other
bona fide candidate shall be made by such labor organization
and its officers, with equal treatment as to the expense of such
distribution.
54
This is one sentence.
The Charterhouse of Parma was the first great novel in French. How
could the Code civil's style have inspired Stendhal? "The Code attempts to define
legal concepts in their simplest, most direct, and unequivocal form," wrote a
scholar of French literature, "and this attempt to establish a coherent legal
procedure for carefully defined situations in human activity carries over into
Stendhal's [role as a] cataloguer of human emotions in the same manner in which
the Code civil establishes a written catalogue of man's rights in legal terms.
55
Compare a passage, chosen almost at random, from Moncrieff's56 translation of
The Charterhouse:
53 Crabb, Introduction, supra note 20, at xix, xxx.
54 29 U.S.C. § 481(c) (2012).
55 M.L. Newman, Stendhal and the Code civil, 43 THE FRENCH REV. 434, 437 (1970).
Stendhal's Code civil comment has been used as a pretext to dismiss him intellectually. "No doubt
the seriousness with which his remark has been interpreted and the impetus it provided for
generations of irate critics would have greatly amused Stendhal, yet the remark does constitute a
revealing insight into Stendhal's mind and his work." Id. at 434.
56 C.K. Scott Moncreiff is better known for the definitive translation of Marcel Proust's A la
recherche du temps perdu, which "earned a reputation as one of the great English translations,
almost a masterpiece in its own right." Terence Kilmartin, Note on the Translation, in 1 MARCEL
[Vol. 119
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[T]he Conte had a sense of his own valour, he was full of
generous impulses, he was easily carried away, and at such times
allowed himself to make imprudent speeches. One day when he
was out shooting with some young men, one of them, who had
served under other flags than his, began to belittle the courage
of the soldiers of the Cisalpine Republic. The Conte struck him,
a fight at once followed, and the Conte, who was without support
among all these young men, was killed. This species of duel
gave rise to a great deal of talk, and the persons who had been
engaged in it took the precaution of going for a tour in
Switzerland.
That absurd form of courage, which is called resignation, the
courage of a fool who allows himself to be hanged without a
word of protest, was not at all in keeping with the Contessa's
character. Furious at the death of her husband, she would have
liked Limercati, the rich young man, her intimate friend, to be
seized also by the desire to travel in Switzerland, and there to
shoot or otherwise assault the murderer of Conte Pietranara.
Limercati thought this plan the last word in absurdity, and the
Contessa discovered that in herself contempt for him had killed
her affection. She multiplied her attentions to Limercati; she
sought to rekindle his love, and then to leave him stranded and
so make him desperate. To render this plan of vengeance
intelligible to French readers, I should explain that in Milan, in
a land widely remote from our own, people are still made
desperate by love. 7
The most obviously shared characteristics between this passage and the
Code civil are compression and precision. So much is expressed about these
characters and their relationships and their story, and so clearly-but in so few
words.
Why would it have even occurred to Stendhal to read legislation? First,
the Code civil was written to be read by people exactly like him. It sets out his
rights and obligations as a citizen of a civil society. To read it is to learn about
himself and how he fits into the whole.
Second, because of their political and social passions, 19th century
French novelists often found themselves in contentious dialog with their
government. Flaubert was prosecuted for writing criminal obscenity into
PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF THINGS PAST ix (C.K. Scott Moncreiff& Terence Kilmartin trans., rev.
ed. 1983).
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Madame Bovary.58 In protest against Napoleon III's coup, Victor Hugo exiled
himself,59 and when the Second Empire collapsed 18 years later, he returned and
was promptly elected to the National Assembly,60 from which he soon resigned
when right-wing deputies prevented the Italian revolutionary Garibaldi from
taking his own seat in the Assembly even though Garibaldi had been elected from
four different French constituencies.61 In a Paris newspaper, Zola published an
open letter to the President of the Republic accusing the French army of framing
Dreyfus--"I accuse General Mercier ... I accuse General Billot... I accuse
[General] de Boisdeffre and [General] Gonse"62-daring the government to
prosecute him for criminal libel, which it did.63 After the failed 1905 Russian
Revolution, Trotsky, captured by the Czarists, read French novels in his prison
cell.64
An English barrister, also an academic scholar, wrote that French
statutes have "an order, a logical development, a freshness, a certain elegance,
missing from ours" and "an absence of unfamiliar language, and a purity of
expression, a clarity of utterance, and an overall quality of readability.65 French
drafting is expected to comply with the linguistic standards of the Acaddmie
franqaise, the institution responsible for preserving the French language's
purity.66 A nonspecialized statute-one of general applicability-is considered
well drafted if it is in perfect French and can be understood by a well-educated
citizen of cultured sensibilities.
III. SWEDEN
His Majesty the King requires that the Royal Chancellery in all
written documents endeavour to write in clear and plain
Swedish.
- King Karl XII's Ordinance for the Royal Chancery (1713)
58 See ELISABETH LADENSON, DIRT FOR ART'S SAKE: BOOKS ON TRIAL FROM MADAME BOVARY
ToLOLiTA 17-19, 21 (2007).
59 MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, VICTOR HUGO: A REALISTIC BIOGRAPHY OF THE GREAT ROMANTIC
331-69 (1942). Hugo exiled himself to Brussels after "jeopardiz[ing] his whole fortune by leading
in the resistance" to the 1851 coup d' tat. Id. at 348-49.
60 Id. at 464, 472-73.
61 Id. at 475-76.
62 tmile Zola, J'accuse, L'AuRORE (Paris), Jan. 13, 1898.
63 Peter Zablotsky, Considering the Libel Trial of lmile Zola in Light of Contemporary
Defamation Doctrine, 29 TOuRO L. REv. 59, 61 (2012).
64 ISAAC DEUTSCHER, THE PROPHET ARMED: TROTSKY 1879-1921, at 148 (1980).
65 SIR WILLIAM DALE, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING: A NEW APPROACH 87-88 (1977).
66 Id. at 88.
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Swedish statute-drafting is descended from an ancient tradition in which
law was expected to be understandable to an illiterate peasant hearing it recited
by another illiterate peasant, who had memorized it. This is law based on a
history of agrarian practicality, unrelated to Cartesian rationalism. The modem
results, however, can be as impressive, in their own way, as the Code civil.
A. Words
Ten centuries ago, almost every Swede lived on a farm or in a tiny
village. Rare was a person who could read or write. Disputes were decided in the
local ting, presided over by a lagman, chosen for an ability to memorize law,
which was passed down over generations-as the sagas were-spoken from
memory.67 Rhythm, rhyme, and story permeated law to aid in remembering.
"The past is never dead," wrote William Faulkner. "It's not even past.
68
Just as legislation in common law countries is still constrained by events that
began in the year 1066, which Part IV explains, Swedish law is even now
influenced by events equally ancient.
Sweden today has been prosperous for barely a century. For most of its
history, it was one of the poorest countries in Europe. The term barkbrod still
has some resonance. As recently as the 19th century, when crops failed, peasants
knew well from experience how to scrape bark off trees, elm preferred to pine,
to be baked into bread, as "bark bread was everyday fare in the homesteads of
those parts of the Swedish countryside which most suffered from crop failure. 69
The 20th-century novelist Vilhelm Moberg remembered his grandmother telling
him her recipe for bark bread.7°
During the 1 th and 12th centuries, law was almost entirely oral in
memorized "rhymes or maxims.,71 "To a great extent these laws were
rhythmically constructed, like poems .... thereby the more easily to be fixed in
memory.,72 Beginning in the 13th century, a few oral codes were reduced to
writing, and "even in their written form alliterations, end-rhyme and internal
rhyme have been preserved.73 The written law was
expressed in strong and pithy language which in all its severity
and simplicity still rings out clearly. As language, it is direct and
to the point; full of vivid expressions and forceful basic
67 RUTH BADER GINSBURG & ANDERS BRUZELIUS, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN SWEDEN 28 (1965).
68 WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN act 1, sc. 3.
69 VILHELM MOBERG, A HISTORY OF THE SWEDISH PEOPLE: FROM RENAISSANCE TO
REVOLUTION 47 (Paul Britten Austin trans., 1972).
70 Id.
71 GINSBURG & BRUZEL1US, supra note 67, at 28.
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words .... The authors ... use an effective trick: they vividly
depict imaginary cases. The sentences begin with nu-"now"-
or, as one might say: "let us suppose .. ." and continue in the
present tense. The case they envisage comes alive before our
eyes. Now a man makes ready for his wedding; now the peasants
wish to build a church; now a woman commits whoredom. And
instantly we are in the midst of a lively occurrence. We have the
impression of it's all happening right now, in this very instant.74
Moberg wrote that something of this style "is still heard in our present Statute
Book.,75 Published translations of current Swedish law into English sometimes
obscure that style by converting the Swedish into legalistic English. Compare a
literal translation of the modem Swedish murder provision (on the left) with one
of the published translations (on the right) 76:
74 Id. at 187.
75 Id. at 186-87.
76 The version on the right is from THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN 17 (Thorsten Sellin & Jerome
L. Getz trans., 1972).
Two Swedish criminal code translations have been published. The earlier, primarily by Thorsten
Sellin, is the one quoted here. Id. It is over 40 years old and was published through the Comparative
Law Project's American Series of Foreign Penal Codes at New York University. Id. The latter, by
Norman Bishop, is dated 1999. It is available on a Swedish government website along with a
disclaimer that it is unofficial. The Swedish Penal Code, GOV'T OFFS. SWED.,
http://www.government.se/govemment-policy/udicial-system/the-swedish-penal-code/ (last
visited Oct. 10, 2016). Sellin's is excellent, and Bishop's is quite good. But neither can be used for
this Article except for the example to which this footnote is attached.
Initially because both needed updating, I checked them against current Swedish law and
discovered that Moberg's observation is still accurate a half-century after he made it: something of
the ancient style "is still heard in our present Statute Book." But the two published translations do
not fully capture it. Both of them accurately show the Swedish use of fewer concepts than Anglo-
American law uses. But they convert the plain and simple Swedish style into vocabulary and tone
that evoke legalistic English.
Even the translations' titles do that. Both are titled Penal Code although the current code's drafters
rejected that term's Swedish equivalent. The predecessor code, enacted in 1864, was Strafflagen,
"the Penal Law." The current code is Brottsbalken, "the Criminal Code." Crime is a problem to
which the current code considers punishment to be one possible response but not the only one.
All this is not a criticism of Sellin and Bishop. Their goal was to convey Swedish criminal law's
substance in terms familiar to an audience of Anglo-American lawyers and legal academics.
Distorting the style may have been necessary to making the substance more accessible to that
audience. Sellin and Bishop might have chosen Penal Code, for example, because that is the title
of many U.S. statutes, as well as the Model Penal Code.
For the Brottsbalk sections quoted in this Article, I used, where needed, wording in English that
more accurately conveys the Swedish statutory style. To make sure that I got the sense accurately,
I consulted several people who are skilled in both languages and whose background and judgment
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One who deprives [or robs] A person who takes the life of
another of life is to be another shall be sentenced for
sentenced for murder. murder.
In the literal Swedish, the murderer is a protagonist, as though in a tragic
play, standing spot-lighted stage-center, having done something awful and
awaiting fate. Consider each of the ways in which the literal translation on the
left differs from the previously published one in legalistic English on the right.
One vs. A person: The Swedish begins Den om-He who or She who or,
neutral as to gender, One who. In legalistic English, a provision classifying
people often begins coldly with A person, followed by a list of elements. In logic,
a person accurately conveys the Swedish meaning. But it does not convey the
tone, mood, or style: out of many people, it is he or she or one who has done this
terrible thing.
Deprives [or robs] vs. takes: The Swedish is berdvar, which can be
translated as take, deprive, or, in some contexts, rob. Some of the specialists I
consulted77 feel strongly that rob is the most accurate word to capture ber~var's
force and image in this context. Because that view was not unanimous, I used
both deprive and rob. The strength of feeling among those who prefer rob seems
to corroborate Moberg's observation about imagery "in our present Statute
Book."
Another's life vs. the life of another: In English, both another's life and
the life of another are grammatically correct, but they are stylistically different.
English has two ways to express a possessive. In everyday speech and writing,
the vast majority of possessives are formed by adding an apostrophe and an s to
the possessor noun. For reasons explained in Part V.A, the opposite is true in
documents created by lawyers, who feel compelled to form possessives using the
preposition of.78 Constant use of that form, with other legalisms, creates an
officious tone. Although both forms are available in Swedish, the av (ol) form is
hardly ever used in everyday life or in statutes.
Is to be vs. shall be: In Swedish, the main verb is ddms, which seems to
express a guilty defendant's inevitable fate, a dooming judgment. It does not
expressly state a court's duty to convict or sentence. The duty is inherent in the
situation. In Anglo-American statutes, a duty to act is nearly always expressed,
although often in the passive (shall be sentenced). One legislative culture
habitually expresses a duty while the other often implies it.
B. Codes
Early Swedish law was literature, though not in the French sense. It was
narrative and poetry. Moberg reports that the communities law portion in one
77 See supra the last paragraph of note 76.
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provincial code ended with "a poem, directed at those who later must interpret
in light of legislative policy" 79:
Now hath this statute so been said and meant,
that each with his own lot may be content.
How each shall live in his own right,
and they all build in common plight.80
In 1350, the local codes, both oral and written, were superseded by two
national codes, one governing towns, which were few and small, and the other
governing the countryside. In 1734, these were superseded by a single national
code, Sveriges Rikes Lag, which is still in effect, although nearly all of it has
been rewritten over the succeeding 280 years.81 The 1734 code was drafted as "a
lawbook for the people, in plain language and susceptible of comprehension by
laymen.,82 In editions updated annually, it was sold for generations in general
bookstores for the public. The government now puts statutes on websites. When
ordinary citizens want to know their law, they can read it online.
Sveriges Rikes Lag is divided into 12 balkar, a word that itself causes a
translation problem. Balk is an archaic word for "book." Sveriges Rikes Lag is a
code made up of 12 books-not in the sense of volumes, since all the balkar are
published in one volume. But balk is usually translated as "code," and for lack











Execution of Judgments, and
Debts.
79 MOBERG, supra note 69, at 19 (emphasis added).
80 Id.
81 Stig Str6mholm, General Features of Swedish Law, in SWEDISH LAW IN THE NEW
MILLENNIUM 31, 39-40 (Michael Bogdan ed., 2000).
82 Anders Bruzelius & Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Introduction, in THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL
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The sequence still reflects a narrative view of law. "After the individual
has married, started a family, inherited her parents' land and built a house, she
goes into trade," but it all ends badly "in crime and bankruptcy.
83
Most balkar have been replaced since 1734 with entirely new versions.84
The balk on crimes has been replaced twice-in i864 and again in 1962. 85 The
balkar are supplemented with non-code statutes. For example, most contract
issues are resolved not in the Commerce Code but instead in separate later
statutes on contracts and goods sales.86
Swedish codes are somewhere between the French model and the
American. A Swedish code is meant to be enduring. It will be more complete
than an American one. But it will not necessarily be exclusive.
As a young academic in 1961 and 1962, Ruth Bader Ginsburg began
learning Swedish and researching Swedish civil procedure.87 Her collaboration
with Anders Bruzelius, a Swedish judge, produced a treatise on Swedish judicial
procedure, published in 196588 while she was an assistant law professor teaching
American civil procedure at the Rutgers law school in Newark. In 1968, she and
Bruzelius published a translation of the Judicial Procedure balk's 1942
recodification8 9
They felt a special challenge putting into English the straightforward
Swedish wording, which its drafters had crafted so that "laymen would be able
to read and understand" a procedural code9 -as though anyone walking into a
federal courthouse would be able to read the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and know what to expect. In an introduction to their translation, Bruzelius and
Ginsberg spent two pages explaining, down to sentence structure and verb tense,
how they tried to reproduce that style in English.91 It is a model of the respect for
the text being translated-a respect that gives the translation intellectual
authority and integrity.
83 LAURA CARLSON, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF SWEDISH LAW 44-45 (2012).
84 Hans-Heinrich Vogel, Sources of Swedish Law, in SWEDISH-LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
53 (Michael Brogdan ed., 2000).
85 Id. at 48, 53.
86 Jan Hellner, Contracts and Sales, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH LAW 201, 201 (Stig
Str6mholm ed., 1981).
87 Wendy Webster Williams, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's Rutgers Years: 1963-1972, 31
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 229, 231-32 (2010). Ginsburg taught Civil Procedure, Comparative Law,
Federal Jurisdiction, Conflict of Laws, and Remedies at Rutgers. Id. at 233.
88 GINSBURG & BRUZELIUS, supra note 67; see also Ruth Ginsburg & Anders Bruzelius,
Professional Legal Assistance in Sweden, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 997 (1962).
89 THE SWEDISH CODE OF JUDICIAL PROCEDURE (Anders Bruzelius & Ruth Bader Ginsburg
trans., 1968).
90 Bruzelius & Ginsburg, Introduction, supra note 82, at 1, 13.
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Ginsburg's research in Swedish law was her first significant professional
accomplishment. The treatise and translation were her first and second books.92
Her work in Sweden also had a direct influence on the development of
American law of sex discrimination and gender equality. At that time, feminist
points of view were ridiculed in the United States but treated respectfully in
Sweden. Roe v. Wade93 had not yet been decided. Although abortion was illegal
in the U.S., it was legal-and not controversial-in Sweden. Fifty years later, it
is still disputed in the United States, where its legality is constantly under assault.
Ginsburg experienced living in a society where government "had begun to take
an active interest in freeing men and women from prescribed gender roles."
94
That was a revelation. It became an image and a benchmark for what she later
fought to establish in her home country.
C. Process
Although the American legislative process is animated by lobbying, the
Swedish process is not. American-style lobbyists would have little or no
leverage. Individual legislators cannot legally accept private campaign
contributions. They can hear arguments on the merits by interest groups. But
paying a lobbyist to obtain access would be pointless. Interest groups
automatically have access, and they get it for free.
What makes that possible are Statens Offentliga Utredningar ("SOU"),
commissions appointed to investigate and report on questions that may or may
not need legislation. The literal translation is "The State's Public Investigations."
Because state suggests a different meaning in the United States, an American
might want to say Government Public Investigations. But in a parliamentary
system, the word government does not mean the same thing it does to us. When
a newscaster says, "The Italian government fell today," that does not mean that
revolutionaries have seized Rome. "The government" is the political cabinet
made up of ministers. When a parliamentary government falls, the ministers are
replaced by other ministers, perhaps from other parties. Thus, a "government"
commission might be a politicized one, which SOU commissions definitely are
92 Henna Hill Kay, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Professor of Law, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10-11
(2004). Even though Ginsburg was tied for first in her class when she graduated from Columbia's
law school in 1959, no law firm, because of sex discrimination, would hire her. Id. at 59. She
received only one clerkship offer, and she got that only because her mentor on the Columbia faculty
threatened never to send the judge another clerk. Id. at 9. When Rutgers hired her in 1963, fewer
than 20 tenure-track law professors in the United States were women. Id. at 20. In 1969, Lund
University in Sweden awarded her an honorary degree-an extraordinary distinction for a junior
faculty member who had not yet received tenure in her own country. Williams, supra note 87, at
236. Rutgers gave her tenure later that year. Id. at 229, 239.
93 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94 IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIzHNIK, NoToRious RBG (2015).
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not. We can call them SOU commissions.9 That is faithful to the Swedish
terminology-Statens Offentliga Utredningar-and their reports are published
in a series called SOU, numbered by year.
Dozens of SOU commissions are at work at any given time.96 In 2009, a
typical year, 95 separate SOU reports were published. SOU commissions are
made up of disinterested experts, representatives of major stakeholders in the
issues, a judge or senior lawyer, and sometimes a member of the Riksdag
(Parliament). A ministry will issue a directiv, terms of reference which charge
the commission with the issue to be investigated and set out parameters for its
inquiry.97 The commission will perform a real investigation. It will evaluate
evidence. It might do some empirical research of its own. It will hold hearings,
and it will invite the views of interested groups and entities.
98
The commission's report may include a draft of proposed legislation, as
well as a book-length analysis of the reasons why the legislation is needed and
exactly how the draft, if enacted, will have the desired effect.99 Each report is
published. This is done as bound volumes in the SOU series, and commission
reports are also available online as book-length PDFs, downloadable from a
government website.l0 0
Unlike the supporting materials for a congressional committee report,
these are not scrap-booked witness transcripts and exhibits. An SOU commission
report might be hundreds of pages of analysis written by the commission together
with the supporting data. These are professional investigations.
Through a process called remiss, the minister who charged the SOU
commission will invite evaluation of the report by interested groups and entities,
including government agencies. The number invited might be as few as a handful
or as many as a hundred.101 Large organizations have full-time employees whose
job is to respond to SOU reports and write comments on them.102 Because the
95 English-language commentaries and translations sometimes call them Royal Commissions,
but that is not an accurate translation of the words or the concept. Kunglig (royal) is not in the
name. Commentaries and translations are more often done by British writers than by Americans,
and Swedes learn British English in school. The Royal Commission misnomer comes from the
British habit of attaching royal to public entities' names, such as the Royal Mail and the Royal
Navy.
96 Less important matters are investigated by officials in the relevant ministry, who may draft
legislation accompanied by small reports published in the Ds series. See Stig Str6mholm,
Introduction, in AN INTRODUCTION TO SWEDISH LAW, supra note 86, at 21, 38; see also DALE,
supra note 65, at 101.
97 DALE, supra note 65, at 98-99; Str6mholm, Introduction, supra note 96, at 21, 35.
98 DALE, supra note 65, at 99.
99 Str6mholm, Introduction, supra note 96, at 21, 36.
100 See STATENS OFFENTLIGA UTREDNINGAR, SOK PA WEBBPLASTEN, http://www.sou.gov.se/
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commission's report has been published online, the public has easy access to it
as well. Remiss forces interest groups to put all their arguments into the public
record, where other interest groups and the public can read and respond to them.
The commission's report, its proposed draft legislation, and the remiss
comments are then reviewed in the ministry, which will usually do some
redrafting in light of the remiss comments.10 3 A draft of significant legislation
would be referred to a law council (Lagrddet) of select appellate judges to review
the draftsmanship quality as well as consistency with existing statutes.104 When
the ministry and cabinet (and where it is involved, Lagrddet) are satisfied with
the draft, it is sent to the Riksdag as a government bill.
The reports generated up to this point are the preparatory materials on
which a court relies in interpreting a statute.10 5 They are so detailed that
legislation, despite its general language, is usually clearer in meaning than an
American statute would be.
Preparatory materials are not legislative history in the American
understanding of that term. The Riksdag has legislative committees, but their
purpose is to give a bill a final vetting before enactment. A committee will write
its own report and can recommend amendments to a government bill or that the
bill be returned to the ministry for rework.10 6 In European lawmaking, a
legislature's function is to approve or reject on behalf of the public. A Riksdag
committee does not investigate a need for legislation. It does not originate
legislation. And it does not draft legislation. The big thinking goes into a statute
before the wording reaches the legislature for approval or rejection.
Judicial reliance on preparatory materials is not without criticism. "The
fact that the courts tend to follow faithfully the views indicated in the preparatory
materials has resulted in the appearance of the somewhat disparaging phrase
'legislation by explanatory statement' as an expression for something which
inherently conflicts with the principle of legality."'1 7 The counter-argument is
that when the elected legislature enacted the statute, it enacted the meaning
explained in the preparatory materials. And nothing is considered to be in the
preparatory materials unless it appears in a formal report.108
103 Stromholm, Introduction, supra note 96, at 21, 37.
104 Id.; see also DALE, supra note 65, at 101-02.
105 CARLSON, supra note 83, at 42.
106 DALE, supra note 65, at 102; Str6mholm, Introduction, supra note 96, at 21, 37.
107 Suzanne Wennberg, Criminal Law, in SWEDISH LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM, supra note
84, at 158.
108 DALE, supra note 65, at 304.
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D. Empiricism, Accessibility, Accountability
Hard facts supported by data or other empirical evidence are highly
valued. Simple solutions are preferred over convoluted ones. Special privileges
and backdoor influence are thought to be disreputable. To be considered good
legislation, a generally applicable statute would have to be understandable to an
educated Swede. Specialized legislation, such as statutes regulating insurance or
financial markets, would have to be understandable to an educated Swede who
knows something about the subject being regulated.
People more easily trust law when they can understand it and can see it
being created through a transparent process that promotes consensus and
minimizes favoritism. The World Values Survey is a comprehensive database
surveying values across cultures.09 Social scientists in 60 countries use common
questionnaires to discover prevailing public assumptions. Below are the
responses, during the 2010-2014 survey cycle, from Sweden and the United
States, when respondents were asked how much confidence they have in their
national legislature."0
A great deal Not very Not at all
of confidence much
or quite a lot
Sweden 59.3% 31.2% 6.7%
United States 20.2 57.1 19.6
Law loses some of its moral authority when people cannot understand it
and when they distrust those who make it. To the extent law lacks moral
authority, people feel less inhibited about violating it.
An American might not easily appreciate the extent to which public
accountability is valued. An illustration from Brottsbalken might help:
20:1 One who, intentionally or carelessly, by act or
omission in the exercise of public authority, disregards his
office's responsibilities will be sentenced for breach of duty
[tjinstefel] to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years. If
the offense is considered petty in view of the perpetrator's
authority or his position's relationship in other respects to the
exercise of public power, or other circumstances, punishment is
not to be imposed.
109 For an example of its use in public policy analysis, see BRADLEY & TAYLOR, supra note 5,
at 20, 83-87, 92-94, 97, 101.
110 World Values Survey Data Analysis Tool, WORLD VALUES SURVEY,
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If a crime mentioned in the first paragraph has been
committed intentionally and is regarded as grave, a sentence for
grave breach of duty [grovt tjdnstefel] to imprisonment of at
least six months and at most six years shall be imposed. In
assessing whether the crime is grave, special attention is to be
given as to whether the offender seriously abused his position or
whether the crime caused serious harm or a substantial improper
benefit to a private person or the public.
The Swedish term tjdnstefel has no English equivalent, even approximately.
Tjdnste in this context means government employment. This is a crime that only
a government employee can commit, and it applies to all government employees
except legislators. Backe, Bruzelius, and Wdngstedt translate fel as defect or
error, as in skrivfel, error in writing-or what we would call a scrivener's error.I l '
The leading general purpose Swedish-English dictionary translatesfel as fault,
error, mistake, blunder, omission.112 Backe, Bruzelius, and Wdngstedt translate
tjdnstefel as "breach of (official) duty" or "service irregularity."'1 13 Grave breach
of duty (grovt tjdnstefel), the crime defined in article 20:1 's second paragraph,
amounts to abuse of authority. But simple breach of duty-defined in the first
paragraph and punishable by up to two years' imprisonment-is the crime of not
doing one's job properly.
During the 22 years from 1989, when the current wording was adopted,
to 2011, article 20:1 has been at issue in 43 reported appellate decisions1 14--in a
country with a population smaller than North Carolina's. As with any crime
anywhere, many other prosecutions would have been resolved in trial courts
without appeals. Appellate courts did not need to clarify statutory meaning. The
1989 amendment merely revised, in a straightforward way, wording that was in
Brottsbalken when enacted in 1962.115
III TORILD BACKE, ANDERS BRUZELIUS & ERIK WANGSTEDT, KORTFATTAD SVENSK-ENGELSKA
JURIDISK ORDLISTA, CONCISE SWEDISH-ENGLISH GLOSSARY OF LEGAL TERMS 38 (1973). Anders
Bruzelius was Ruth Bader Ginsburg's coauthor and cotranslator. See supra notes 87-94 and
accompanying text.
112 PRISMA'S SWEDISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 79 (1993).
113 BACKE, BRUZEL1US & WANGSTEDT, supra note 111, at 97.
114 Below are the citations in the two appellate reporters. (As in much of Europe, Swedish cases
are not known by the parties' names.)
NJA (Nyttjuridiskt arkiv): 1990 s. 542; 1992 s. 310; 1992 s. 555; 1992 s. 812; 1992 s. 838; 1993
s. 216; 1993 s. 360; 1994 s. 108; 1994 s. 304; 1994 s. 325; 1996 s. 237; 1996 s. 307; 1996 s. 806;
1997 s. 186; 1997 s. 368; 2001 s. 35; 2001 s. 188; 2001 s. 336; 2001 s. 342; 2003 s. 291; 2004 s.
164; 2005 s. 385; 2006 s. 145; 2008 s. 470; 2009 s. 567.
RH (Rdttsfall firdn hovrdtterna): 1993:45; 1994:70; 1994:86; 1995:144; 1996:24; 1997:23;
1997:73; 2000:90; 2003:45; 2004:42; 2007:31; 2007:40; 2007:46; 2007:51; 2008:51; 2008:62;
2011:27; 2011:31.
115 See THE PENAL CODE OF SWEDEN, supra note 76.
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Often defendants are police officers. Judges are covered by article 20:1
and have been prosecuted.'1 16 Many defendants are acquitted, and the convicted
ones are usually let off with a fine or no sentence at all. The true punishment,
even for those acquitted, is the embarrassment of a public prosecution in an
accountability culture.
IV. COUNTING CONCEPTS: FUZZY VS. FUSSY
[T]he more words there are, the more words there are about
which doubts may be entertained.
- Lord Halsbury, Preface, The Laws of England (1907)
The distinction between fussy logic and fuzzy logic began in
philosophy1 17 and migrated through scientific and mathematical applications into
a distinction between two approaches to legislative logic."1
8
A fussy personality obsesses over details, many of them trivial.
Fussiness means picky, finicky, exacting, excessively concerned with
cleanliness, petty, and hard or impossible to please. In some instances, the result
can be claustrophobia-inducing clutter, otherwise known as too much, or in
Yiddish ungapatchka. A fussy statute is usually a bossy statute. And it invariably
contains large numbers of concepts. It is filled with exhaustive detail addressing
a problem's every conceivable aspect and thus creating many litigation issues,
which become expensive to resolve.
Fuzziness, when referring to self-expression, means blurry, foggy, hazy,
unclear, and indistinct. Sometimes fuzzy wording is caused by a writer's
confusion and the absence of clear thought. But sometimes fuzzy wording has
been chosen wisely to express clear insights about big concepts. A fuzzy statute
contains little detail and addresses a problem with broad concepts. Sometimes
people subject to a fuzzy statute can feel that the statute is a helpful guide rather
than a hectoring nuisance.
Fussiness is about grains of sand. Fuzziness is about the whole beach.
The distinction concerns both expression and substance. Fussiness can be too
many ideas-or just the right amount if the situation truly needs to be fussed.
Fuzziness might be too few ideas-or just the right amount if the situation needs
big-picture thinking. These are a continuum's opposite ends. In the middle are
statutes with specifically worded sections but without overdone detail.
116 See, e.g., NJA (Nyttjuridiskt arkiv) 2004 s. 164.
117 See SUSAN HAACK, DEVIANT LOGIC, FUZZY LOGIC (1974).
118 See Lisbeth Campbell, Legal Drafting Styles: Fuzzy or Fussy?, 3 MURDOCH UNIV. ELEC.
J.L. No. 2 (1996), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MurUEJL/1996/17.html; John M. Greene,
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Fussy, over-conceptualized statutes are filled with duties. But duties are
not the solution to all problems, or even most of them. Every duty imposes costs.
If a statute creates too many duties, those subject to it will resist enforcement and
resent what is being done to them. Many duties are necessary and unavoidable.
But others are ineffectual. They do not accomplish a legislature's goals, or their
costs exceed their value.
Conditioning a benefit on compliance gets results through
encouragement and reward. Imposing a duty gets results by threats. Sometimes
conditioning a benefit is more effective, and sometimes a duty is necessary.119
But in a fussy and excessively conceptualized legislative culture, the default is
to create duties, and the power of incentives is underappreciated.
A. Two Statutes Requiring Drafting in Plain Language
In the left column below is a fussy, over-conceptualized statute-the
U.S. Plain Writing Act-and in the right column is a fuzzy one-the
corresponding portion of the Swedish Language Act.
120
119 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
120 The rest of the Language Act (not quoted here) establishes Swedish as "Sweden's principal
language." (art. 4) as well as the language of government (art. 10); establishes as "the national
minority languages" Finnish, Yiddish, Meinkieli, Romany Chib, and Sami (art. 7); and imposes
on government "a special responsibility to protect and promote the national minority languages"
(art. 8) as well as Swedish sign language (art. 9). Mednkieli is a Finnish dialect. Romany Chib is
the language of the Romany people, whom Americans call Gypsies, a term the Romany consider
derogatory. Sami is a group of languages spoken by the Sami people, whom Americans call Lapps,
a term the Sami consider derogatory. On a website, the Swedish government provides translations
of the Language Act in all five official languages, including three versions of Sami, as well as in
English. See Other Languages, GOV'T OFFS. OF SWEDEN, http://www.government.se/other-
languages/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
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Plain Writing Act (U.S.)
124 Stat 2861
§ 3. DEFINITIONS. IN THIS ACT:
(1) AGENCY-The term "agency"
means an Executive agency, as defined




(A),means any document that-
(i) is necessary for obtaining any
Federal Government benefit or service
or filing taxes;
(ii) provides information about
any Federal Government benefit or
service; or
(iii) explains to the public how to
comply with a requirement the Federal
Government administers or enforces;
(B) includes (whether in paper or
electronic form) a letter, publication,
form, notice, or instruction; and
(C) does not include a regulation.
(3) PLAIN WRITING-The term
"plain writing" means writing that is
clear, concise, well- organized, and
follows other best practices
appropriate to the subject or field and
intended
audience.
§ 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF FEDERAL
AGENCIES.
(a) PREPARATION FOR
IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAIN WRITING
REQUIREMENTS-
(1) IN GENERAL-Not later than 9
months after the date of enactment of
this Act, the head of each agency
shall-
(A) designate 1 or more senior
officials within the agency to oversee
the agency implementation of this Act;
(B) communicate the requirements
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(C) train employees of the agency
in plain writing;
(D) establish a process for
overseeing the ongoing compliance of
the agency with the requirements of
this Act;
(E) create and maintain a plain
writing section of the agency's website
as required under paragraph (2) that is
accessible from the homepage of the
agency's website; and
(F) designate 1 or more agency
points-of-contact to receive and
respond to public input on-
(i) agency implementation of
this Act; and
(ii) the agency reports required
under section 5.
(2) WEBSITE-The plain writing
section described under paragraph
(1)(E) shall-
(A) inform the public of agency
compliance with the requirements of
this Act; and
(B) provide a mechanism for the
agency to receive and respond to
public input on-
(i) agency implementation of
this Act; and
(ii) the agency reports required
under section 5.
(b) REQUIREMENT TO USE PLAIN
WRITING IN NEW DOCUMENTS-
Beginning not later than 1 year after
the date of enactment of this Act, each
agency shall use plain writing in every
covered document of the agency that
the agency issues or substantially
revises.
(c) GUIDANCE.-
(1) IN GENERAL-Not later than 6
months after the date of enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget shall develop
and issue guidance on implementing
the requirements of this section. The
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Director may designate a lead agency,
and may use interagency working
groups to assist in developing and
issuing the guidance.
(2) INTERIM GUIDANCE-Before the
issuance of guidance under paragraph
(1), agencies may follow the guidance
of-
(A) the writing guidelines
developed by the Plain Language
Action and Information Network; or
(B) guidance provided by the head
of the agency that is consistent with the
guidelines referred to in subparagraph
(A).
§ 5. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
(a) INITIAL REPORT.-Not later than 9
months after the date of enactment of
this Act, the head of each agency shall
publish on the plain writing section of
the agency's website a report that
describes the agency plan for
compliance with the requirements of
this Act.
(b) ANNUAL COMPLIANCE
REPORT-Not later than 18 months
after the date of enactment of this Act,
and annually thereafter, the head of
each agency shall publish on the plain
writing section of the agency's website
a report on agency compliance with the
requirements of this Act.
Congress cannot restrain itself from over-complicating the issues-even
in a statute requiring plain language drafting. Fussing is in American
legislatures' DNA.
Sweden adopted the Language Act in 2009. Its article 11 was preceded
by equally fuzzy provisions in government administration statutes in 1982, 1986,
and 1995.121 The 1986 version, for example, required government agencies to
121 Barbro Erhrenberg-Sundin, The Quality of Legislation: The Swedish View, Address before
the Legal Revisers Group, European Commision Legal Service 5 (Sept. 27, 2002). The earliest
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"express themselves in a comprehensible manner."122 The prime minister's office
now employs a small group of language experts and lawyers to review proposed
administrative regulations and legislation to make sure they are "as clear and
user-friendly as possible."123 Nothing "may be sent to the printer without [their]
approval."
24
A 2001 evaluation of government texts showed that "archaic, difficult,
and obscure words as well as long and complicated sentences have almost
disappeared from the bureaucratic language."
1 25
The over-conceptualized U.S. Plain Language Act, however, has
changed little or nothing. An exhaustive study of documents from 35 federal
agencies found that "compliance has been poor.'' 126 Fuzziness changed behavior
where fussiness is failing.
The U.S. Plain Writing Act imposes costs by requiring, in detail, conduct
of questionable value that must be paid for from taxes. If all the costs associated
with unnecessarily detailed requirements over thousands of statutes, state and
federal, could be totaled and diverted, the sum might be used instead to help
repair crumbling infrastructure, help improve education, and provide other
public benefits.
Out of distrust, Congress piled on make-work requirements. One
imagines legislators sitting around a table thinking up ways to badger
administrators into submission on the plain language issue while staffers take
notes. "Make 'em do X!" says a legislator. "Yeah and make 'em do Y, too!" says
another. It did not happen exactly like that. But it might as well have. Congress
has overdone duties so many times in so many fields that administrators have
become skilled at making perfunctory shows of compliance while continuing to
do whatever they have been doing in the past.
Here is how an agency could comply: It would designate some senior
official to oversee plain writing, which section 4(a)(1)(A) requires. That person
will already have so many other responsibilities that this new one will get lost in
122 Id. at 5.
123 Anne-Marie Hasselrot, The Swedish Approach to Clear Legislation, CLARITY, Nov. 2012,
at 36.
124 Id.
125 Barbro Erhrenberg-Sundin, Plain Language in Sweden: The Results After 30 Years (Oct. 5,
2004) (speech to "600 high-level Mexican public servants" by a Swedish Justice Ministry senior
advisor charged with compliance), http://www.plainlanguage.gov/usingPL/world/world-
sweden.cfm. Regeringskansliet-the Swedish equivalent of the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget-has published a 16-page two-column list: in the left column, words and phrases to be
replaced, and in the right column, their plain language equivalents. Svarta listan: Ord ochfraser
som kan ersdttas i fofattningssprdk (2011) ("The Black List: Words and Phrases That Can Be
Replaced in Statutes and Administrative Regulations"),
http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/243/a/I 9775/dictionary/true.
126 Rachel Stabler, "What We've Got Here Is Failure to Communicate ": The Plain Writing Act
of 2010, 40 MIAMI J. LEGIS. 280, 296 (2013).
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the shuffle, except that to comply with section 4(a)(1)(B) and (C), the official
will send to everyone in the agency a manual on plain writing with a cover memo
reciting the Act's requirements. If the memo quotes the Act at length, the
recipients will not be able to finish reading it because the Act itself is
incomprehensible. They might glance at the manual but will leave it on a shelf
or in a drawer and forget about it because they have so much else to do. To
comply with section 4(a)(2), the agency will add a page to its website on plain
language requirements. The agency will designate someone to receive public
complaints about incomprehensible agency documents and regulations. That
'person will already have many other responsibilities, and if anybody ever
complains, she or he will pass the complaint up a command chain, where it will
be ignored. The agency will receive a document from the Office of Management
and Budget detailing some requirements. The agency has received many
documents like this in the past, and agency employees who read this one will
sigh because they are overworked already, and this will be more distraction from
getting their jobs done. Someone in the agency will write the reports required by
the Act. The reports will be in plain English and list the employees who were
designated to do things; list the things they did (but in bland wording obscuring
the fact that they did not really do much); mention the webpage; and say that few
or no complaints have been received. A congressional employee will read the
reports and write a memo to a supervisor saying the agency complied with the
Act.
The only part of the Plain Writing Act that might actually cause a real
change in agency behavior is section 4(b), which is similar to-but less than-
Sweden's Language Act article 11. Section 4(b) covers only specified agency
documents, and it specifically exempts regulations. The Swedish statute's article
11 applies to everything. At first glance, section 4(c) looks like it would change
practice, but it merely ordered the executive branch to do what it was already
doing. The federal government already had a working group called the Plain
Language Action and Information Network, which developed plain language
guidelines in the 1990s.
1 27
Would the Plain Writing Act have been less effective if it had been
limited to section 4(b) and a compressed version of the section 3 definitions?
Actually a stripped-down statute might have been more effective because the
goal-the thing Congress really wanted-would have been undeniably obvious
if not surrounded by badgering and nuisance clutter. When a statute imposes half
a dozen requirements, only one of which truly matters, the targets of the
legislation will spread their compliance efforts over all the requirements rather
127 Federal Plain Language Guidelines, PLANLANGUAGE.GOV,
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/howto/guidelines/FederalPLGuidelines/index.efin?CFID=4491 11
4&CFTOKEN=6b8820677392a62-335EFD 16-C9F6-8FCD-
Fl 145FB4513DB2AF&jsessionid=9DDDFEFA9689AE 156EE99A6FF8E907AD.chh (last
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than concentrating on what Congress really wants. Legislation can expand legal
requirements. But it cannot expand an employee's day beyond 24 hours.
B. Suspicion and Trust
In common law countries, legislatures have long histories of suspicion.
They do not trust administrative agencies, and for centuries they have not trusted
judges. Part IV(B) describes the history behind that distrust and suspicion.
American legislators often talk about giving guidance to courts. But the
original-and continuing-function of legislative fussiness in common law
countries is to control courts through detail. Suspicion, however, can become
dysfunctional when every statute is overly detailed regardless of whether
fussiness is appropriate to the problem being addressed by legislation.
A fuzzy statute, on the other hand, assumes cooperation. The Swedish
Language Act's drafters trusted that administrators would do what the statute
requires, and their trust seems to have been rewarded.
One of the World Values Survey's questions is "Generally speaking,
would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful
in dealing with people?" Below are the responses from Sweden, the United
States, the other two common law countries surveyed, plus Iraq and Russia.
128
(The United Kingdom and France were not surveyed.)
Most people Need to be
can be trusted very careful
Sweden 60.1% 37.2%
New Zealand 55.3 42.1
Australia 51.4 47.8
United States 34.8 64.3
Iraq 30.0 63.8
-Russia 27.8 66.2
Americans are as suspicious and distrustful as Iraqis and Russians, who
for generations have been spied on by secret police.
Suspicion is a perception, which might-or might not-be justified by
reality. Americans are as suspicious as people living in authoritarian societies-
even though Americans do not live in an authoritarian society. There is no
evidence that Americans have genuine reasons to distrust each other. In fact, of
the populations surveyed recently by the World Values Survey, those who would
seem most similar to us are Australians and New Zealanders, who speak our
language and whose law and history resemble ours, with Britain as a common
128 See WORLD VALUE SURVEY, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp (last
visited Oct. 6, 2016).
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ancestor. But Australians and New Zealanders are more willing than we are to
trust each other.
Because suspicion is so pervasive in American culture, a legislator here
might react with incredulity at the idea that people can be trusted to do what a
statute asks them to do. Fussy, bossy, hectoring, and badgering legislation might
seem to be the only way to get people to behave. Sometimes it is. But American
legislators typically proceed on the assumption that it always is.
C. Income Tax
Although fuzzy statutes are usually simple ones, fuzziness and simplicity
are not the same thing. An ordinance prohibiting driving faster than 35 miles per
hour within city limits is simple legislation, but numbers are never fuzzy. The
real issue in a tax code is the quantity of concepts. A legislature might over-
conceptualize a tax code to capture as much tax as possible (fussing). Or a
legislature might over-conceptualize for the opposite reason: to create
opportunities to avoid tax.
American-style individual income tax adjustments and deductions do not
exist in Swedish law, except for items like pension contributions and
unreimbursed work expenses such as tools and overnight travel; commuting
expenses are also deductible. 129 This is a very simple tax system.130 It is so simple
that the government performs the service of preparing the taxpayer's return for
taxpayer approval or rejection.
Skatteverket, the Swedish equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service,
receives from employers and financial institutions the same information IRS
does in the United States, and, like any other country's tax agency, it knows the
taxpayer's home and work addresses. Skatteverket computes the taxpayer's
income tax, including the pension contribution and commuting deduction, along
with any real property tax, which Skatteverket also collects, and sends a proposed
tax return to each taxpayer. If the numbers on the return are accurate, the taxpayer
accepts it. If not-for example, if the taxpayer claims unreimbursed work
expenses that Skatteverket would not know about-the taxpayer rejects the return
and submits one that the taxpayer generates, often online. Several other countries
129 See Tax Liability in Sweden for Individuals, SKATTEVERLET,
http://www.skatteverket.se/servicelankar/otherlanguages/inenglish/individualsandemployees/decl
aringtaxesforindividuals.4.7be5268414bea064694c5df.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2016); Common
Deductions in the Tax Return, SKATTEVERLET,
http://www.skatteverket.se/servicelankar/otherlanguages/inenglish/individualsandemployees/decl
aringtaxesforindividuals/commondeductionsinthetaxretum.4.7be5268414bea064694c75e.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2016).
130 For an example of a typical individual's tax computation, see SWEDISH TAX AGENCY, TAXES
IN SWEDEN 2013: AN ENGLISH SUMMARY OF TAX STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF SWEDEN 22 (Dec.
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with simplified tax codes use similar systems.131 Because Skatteverket's numbers
are usually accurate-which is possible because the tax law is so simple-most
Swedes accept the return and file it.
A Swedish taxpayer can file by sending a text message from a cell phone
to Skatteverket or by making a telephone call or by using an iPhone app.132 For
most taxpayers with salaried-only income, checking Skatteverket's math and
then filing the return takes little time or effort. The government did the
paperwork for them in the first place with Skatteverket's proposed return, which
was computer generated from data Skatteverket already has.
133
There is nothing of what we experience-detailed record-keeping,
rifling through checkbooks and credit card statements looking for deductible
expenses, Turbotax, H&R Block, and tax accountants. IRS estimates that a U.S.
taxpayer who files using Form 1040EZ (the "easy" version of Form 1040) takes,
on average,five hours and spends $40 to prepare it, and a taxpayer who files with
Form 1040 itself takes 16 hours and spends $270.114
Over-conceptualization in U.S tax law is not caused by Congress's
suspicion that people will not pay. Instead, the tax system is being used as a
Christmas tree to satisfy interest groups with special tax treatment for everything
from mortgage borrowing to carried interest income earned by hedge fund
managers. The giveaways are so many and so complicated that the tax system as
a whole is incomprehensible to anyone who is not a tax specialist. Excessively
conceptualized statutes damage public confidence in government. Pew Research
131 Among them are Spain, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Iceland, and Estonia. Tax Policy Center
Briefing Book: How Could We Improve the Federal Tax System?, TAX POLICY CENTER,
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-other-countries-use-return-free-filing (last
visited Oct. 6, 2016) [hereinafter Tax Policy Center Briefing Book].
132 By phone: dial 020-567-100. If calling from outside Sweden add the country code. Press 1
to start filing the return. Or use the iTunes Skatteverket app, obtainable at
https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/skatteverket/id419081244?mt-8. Instructions in English for filing




133 Skatteverket has an up-to-date computer system, unlike the IRS, which uses antiquated
hardware and software because Congress starves the agency with inadequate appropriations.
134 U.S. INTERNAL REvENUE SERVICE, 2015 FORM 1040 INSTRUCTIONS 98-99 (2016). The
Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center estimates that if the U.S. Tax Code were somewhat less
complex, the IRS would be able to prepare returns for "between 8 million and 60 million
households," saving them the time and money they now waste. Tax Policy Center Briefing Book,
supra note 131. But if the IRS were to do that, profits would shrink for the companies that sell tax
preparation software. Intuit, which sells TurboTax, lobbies ferociously against legislation that
would permit the IRS to do so. Senator Elizabeth Warren, TAX MAZE: HOW THE TAX PREP
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polling has shown that the IRS is among the least trusted parts of the federal
government.135 Congress itself is in last place.
But polling in Sweden shows Skatteverket to be the second most popular
of 26 government agencies 136-even though Swedes pay much more in taxes
than Americans do. 137 When the legislation is simple, the public can actually feel
that an enforcement agency is helpful.
D. Citation Codes
According to the New York University Journal of International Law and
Politics' Guide to Foreign and International Legal Citations, "France does not
have a uniform citation manual. There are some accepted practices, but they are
not followed by all authors.138 For the benefit of American authors writing in
English about French law, the NYU Guide distills ten guidelines from French
publishing customs.139 "There is no uniform code of citation in Sweden," and the
NYU Guide abstracts four guidelines from Swedish customs.140 In Germany,
"[c]itation is quite uniform, although there are neither binding rules regarding
citation nor a national citation manual.,141 The NYU Guide suggests nine
guidelines for American authors writing in English about German law. 142 The
Guide's entries are similar for Australia, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, India, Italy,
Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland,143 and most
other countries.
The University of Chicago Maroonbook contains 41 rules and subrules
for U.S. law citations, and it expresses them, with appendices, in 85 pages.
144
135 IRS Among Least-Popular Federal Agencies, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 16, 2013)
http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/irs-among-least-popular-federal-agencies/.
136 David Wiles, Why Swedes Are Okay With Paying Taxes, SWEDEN (Jan. 8, 2016),
http://sweden.se/society/why-swedes-are-okay-with-paying-taxes/#start. In 2012 and 2013
polling, 66% of individuals and 78% of businesses "have confidence" in Skatteverket; 72% of
individuals and 47% of businesses believe "it is easy to file tax returns and provide information"
to Skatteverket. TAXES IN SWEDEN, supra note 130, at 16-17.
137 Kleven, supra note 12.
138 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS'
GUIDE TO FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CITATIONS 66 (2006) [hereinafter NYU GUIDE].
139 Id. at 67-69.
140 Id. at 196-97.
141 Id. at 73.
142 Id. at 73-77.
143 Id. at 11-13,26-28,46-49,62-64,90-95, 111-13, 116-19, 125-28, 134-37, 141-42, 192-
94, 200-03.
144 UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW & UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM, MANUAL
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In American law, the crown of fussiness might belong to the Bluebook,
which has a nearly uncountable number of rules and subrules expressed, with
appendices, in 560 arabic-numbered pages, not counting italic-numbered front
matter.1 45 To compare the Bluebook with the Maroonbook and with citation
practices in other countries is to understand fussiness at its most basic level.
Below is a comparison of the Bluebook and Maroonbook rules on a very simple
issue: book titles.
145 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds.,
20th ed. 2015) [hereinafter THE BLUEBOOOK].
[Vol. 119
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Title. Cite the full main title as it
appears on the title page, but capitalize
according to rule 8 (unless the title is
not in English, in which case follow
rule 20.2.2(b)). Give a subtitle only if
it is particularly relevant. Do not
abbreviate words or omit articles in the
title. Use large and small capitals:
CAPITAL FLOWS IN THE APEC
REGION (Mohsin S. Khan & Carmen
M. Reinhart eds., 1995).
Title. Generally, use the title of the book
as it appears on the title page. Never
shorten the title. Secondary titles
(subtitles) should be included in the
citation after a colon. Do not add a colon
if the primary title ends with an
exclamation point or question mark.
Book and treatise titles should be
italicized. 147
6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.10
(3d ed. 1999).
When citing a single volume of a
multivolume work, give the main title
of the volume cited. If the title of a
work ends with a numeral, or if
distinguishing between the title and
page number could otherwise be
confusing, the page number should be
set off by a comma and the word "at"
(see rule 3.2(a)):
J.A.S. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, 1914-
1973, at 114-15 (1974).146
This is only a mild comparison. The Bluebook rule quoted here is 152
words, and the Maroonbook rule is 55 words, a ratio of 2.8 to 1. In page count,
the ratio between the Bluebook and the Maroonbook is much higher-6.1 to 1.
The only reason to regulate in this area is to provide citations that
communicate what a reader needs to know.148 To turn the Bluebook's 560 pages
146 Id., R.15.3, at 151.
147 MAROONBOOK, supra note 144, at R.4.5(A)(c).
148 The Official Rules of baseball, football, and basketball are three complicated industrial
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is to find example after example of requirements that have little or nothing to do
with that purpose. A period is
so tiny that only the keenest eye can discern whether [one] is in
roman or italic typeface. Often, if a sentence ends with an
italicized word (it might be the name of a case), in italicizing the
word the writer will inadvertently have italicized the period.
This is "wrong" [and is corrected], if necessary with the aid of a
magnifying glass. 
149
A writer is required to insert a space between a section sign and a number15° but
forbidden to insert one between a dollar sign and a number.151 Mathematical
formulae must be italicized.15 2 The following is a violation: E = mc2. A writer
must "use commas to separate groups of three digits when those numbers contain
five or more uninterrupted digits." Writing "9,876" is strictly forbidden. It must
be written "9876.' ' 153 Authors and editors are not permitted to make these
decisions-and many others-on their own. Their discretion is untrustworthy.
This is the hectoring and badgering of fussy legislation, imposing high
compliance costs for little gain. Time and effort that an editor must spend trying
to figure out whether a comma following an italicized word must itself be
italicized154 is time and effort not spent learning law and how to practice it even
though the editor typically is going into large sums of debt to pay for that
learning, which are needed for a career and for the clients to whom the editor
on which millions of dollars can sometimes rest. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL BASEBALL
RULES (2016), mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2016/official baseballrules.pdf (last visited Oct. 7,
2016); NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, OFFICIAL RULES (2015),
http://www.slideshare.net/monitorsaham/nba-official-rules-
2 01516 (last visited Oct. 7, 2016);
NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL PLAYING RULES (2016),
operations.nfl.com/media/2224/2016-nfl-rulebook.pdf.
Added together, the three books of Official Rules total 517 arabic-numbered pages (not counting
italic-numbered front matter). The Bluebook is 560 arabic-numbered pages. But the comparison is
really worse because the Bluebook's pages are taller and wider. Multiplying height by width by
number of pages, the combined three Official Rules books add up to 14,264 square inches of rules.
The Bluebook is 24,976 square inches of rules.
A sport's Official Rules regulate everything that can happen on a playing field-what is allowed,
what is prohibited, how rules interact with each other, and everything's consequences-as well as
how events are classified and entered into the sport's official records. But the only legitimate reason
for regulating law citation is to make sure that a reader gets information from names, numbers, and
abbreviations.
149 RICHARD A. POSNER, DIVERGENT PATHS: THE ACADEMY AND THE JUDICIARY 126-27 (2016).
150 THE BLUEBOOK, supra note 145, R.6.2(c), at 88.
151 Id., R.6.2(d), at 88.
152 Id., R.7(e), at 90.
153 Id., R.6.2(a)(vii), at 88.
154 Id., R.2.1 (f), at 67, 2.2(c), at 69.
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will owe a fiduciary duty. And the compliance costs multiply. Author time and
effort spent on italicized punctuation issues is time not spent teaching law.
Addressing a real issue, the Maroonbook has this rule:
Rule 2.2 Abbreviating Source Names in Citations
(a) Step one: Check appendices...
(b) Step two: Use your judgment...
Use your judgment. The fuzzy legislator trusts those governed to do the
right thing in gray areas. Later in 2.2(b), the Maroonbook even uses the word
please. Nearly all American law reviews have adopted the Bluebook.
In England-the mother of American law-"[t]here is no uniform code
of citation," 155 no equivalent of the Bluebook or even the Maroonbook. The NYU
Guide suggests eight rules for English cites, 156 but notes that English publications
follow inconsistent practices on "common abbreviations (chapter, section,
etc.)."'57 This appears to cause no harm. And there is no evidence that harm was
caused in the United States before the first Bluebook was published. John
Marshall, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis Brandeis, and Benjamin Cardozo all
did what English writers still do: observe the most basic citation customs
gracefully out of kindness for the reader rather than out of obedience to hundreds
of rules, most of which readers do not care about.
E. The Net Effect of Over-Conceptualization
Excessively conceptualized statutes impose compliance costs that
accumulate into substantial drags on an economy. When the executive branch is
required by statutes like the Plain Writing Act to perform pointless tasks,
government is less efficient and provides fewer services to the public per revenue
dollar. When the public itself must comply with needlessly complicated statutes
like the federal tax code, money is sucked into industries like tax preparers that
do not contribute to prosperity.
A fussy, over-conceptualized statute can include so much detail that it is
unreadable. And there is little predictability in a statute that is hard to
comprehend. Try reading the statute in Appendix C. Read the whole thing, to the
end, even though it will be-as Tennyson said of reading Ben Jonson-like
wading through glue.5 8 No skimming; read every word. There is no surplusage
155 NYU GUIDE, supra note 138, at 223.
156 Id. at 223-26.
157 Id. at 223.
158 JAMES CHARLTON, FIGHTING WORDS: WRITERS LAMBAST OTHER WRITERS-FROM
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in statutes. This is not the worst American homicide statute. It is only average.159
California's is twice as long.
When you are finished--or have given up in frustration-read for
comparison the statutes in Appendices A and B.
160
People governed by fussy, bossy, over-conceptualized statutes
sometimes find them repulsive. Stendhal would not have been inspired by the
Illinois homicide statute's drafting style. It could not be sold in general interest
bookstores, as Sveriges Rikeslag has been, or read and understood by the public
on websites. Educated French citizens and educated Swedes can read and
comprehend much of their law. Educated Americans cannot.
The United States is fussy and excessively conceptualized not just in
legislation, but also in contracts.161 American transactional lawyers are not
satisfied unless the contracts they draft address every contingency on the
assumption that the other side will eventually behave badly. Outside the United
States, contracts tend to be shorter and address fewer issues. There is no evidence
that contracts drafted outside the United States are, on the whole, less effective
than those drafted by American lawyers. 1
62
V. THE UNITED STATES
You oughtta hear the Senate when they're drawing up a bill.
"Whereas's" and "to wit's" are crowded in each codicil.
Such legal terminology would give your heart a thrill.
There's phrases there that no one understands.
The country's in the very best of hands.
- Gene de Paul & Johnny Mercer
163
No one would ever confuse an American statute with literature. But there
is an abundant literature about American statutes, and it is almost entirely
ridicule.164
159 See supra text accompanying note 8.
160 Do not imagine that "grave" (grov) in the Appendix B Swedish homicide statute is so vague
that a court would not know what to do with it. New York uses the same word. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 125.20(1), 125.25(b)(2), 125.25(d)(4) (McKinney 2016).
161 "Written agreements drafted by English and especially American lawyers are often much
longer than those written by their Continental European colleagues." Thomas Lundmark, Verbose
Contracts, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 121 (2001).
162 Claire A. Hill & Christopher King, How Do German Contracts Do as Much with Fewer
Words, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 889 (2004).
163 GENE DE PAUL & JOHNNY MERCER, The Country's in the Very Best of Hands, in LIL' ABNER
(1956).
164 A few examples from Mark Twain and Will Rogers (citations at the end of this footnote):
1: "Suppose you were an idiot. And suppose you were a member of Congress. But I repeat myself'
(Twain). 2: "Congress and the Senate... are just children thats [sic] never grown up" (Rogers). 3:
[Vol. 119
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A. History: Subduing the Majority
After the 1066 Norman invasion, William the Conqueror established the
continental brand of feudalism in England by transforming his followers into
barons and carving up the country into their fiefs.165 Pre-invasion England had
been vaguely feudal but much more loosely than this.166 The new rulers spoke
Norman French, and their subjects spoke Old English.
William promised the English that their law would continue as before.
That law was custom: traditions reflecting community views on what was right
and wrong. Before the Conquest, law had been conducted partly in Old English
but mostly in Latin.167 In both England and Normandy, educated people could
read and speak Latin, and after the Conquest, Latin became even more dominant
in English law because the invaders were not fluent in English, although they
later learned it.168 "Educated" had a different meaning then. Most people were
illiterate, and education was a luxury for the truly wealthy. Eventually Latin was
joined by Norman Law French, pushing what had become Middle English into
third place in law and courts.
When English was heard in post-Conquest law settings, the purpose was
to give English-speakers at least a clue about what was transpiring in a language
they did not understand. Latin and Norman Law French were elite club talk.
Their effect was to exclude the overwhelming majority of the population, who
spoke neither language. To learn Latin or Norman Law French required the
luxury of education. It is still true in England that one's accent marks one's social
class. Centuries ago one's language did that.
This was the opposite of what was happening in Sweden at the same
time. In Sweden, law was accessible to everyone-at first from the lagman, a
neighbor who recited it from memory in words everyone could understand, and
later in writings that could be read aloud to and understood by uneducated
people.169 In England, law was being mystified from the public by two languages,
Latin and Norman Law French. Only those educated enough to know both of
"To my mind Judas Iscariot was nothing but a low, mean, premature Congressman" (Twain). 4:
"[E]very time they make a joke it's a law. And every time they make a law it's a joke" (Rogers).
5: "[T]here is no distinctly native American criminal class except Congress" (Twain). 6: "This
country has come to feel the same when Congress is in session as when the baby gets hold of a
hammer" (Rogers). Sources: 1: Twain in YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 782 (Fred R. Shapiro ed.,
2006). 2: Rogers, letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 2, 1932. 3: Twain in YALE BOOK OF
QUOTATIONS supra, at 774.4: ROGERS, AMBASSADOR OF GOOD WILL, PRINCE OF WIT AND WISDOM,
Ch. 9 (1935). 5: Twain in YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS supra, at 779. 6: Rogers, Daily Telegram
#1230, Congress Session, Rogers Says, Is Like Baby Getting A Hammer (July 4, 1930).
165 DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 62 (1963).
166 Id.
167 Id. at 65.
168 Id. at 67.
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them could understand their law. Today terms of art from Latin and Norman Law
French continue to make law a mystery to the public.
During the 15th and 16th centuries, Middle English and French
gradually merged to become modem English.7° But law went in the other
direction: French took over.17' Coke's hombook (1614) "was mostly in Latin,
the language of the writs[, and] he published Reports (1600-1615) in French-
he said-because that was their customary language."'72 His commentary on
Littleton was in parallel French and English columns.'7 3 This was during and
after the time of Shakespeare. The public could understand their playwrights-
but not their law.
An American statute is considered exceptionally well drafted if a lawyer
can understand it after one reading. But if a lawyer must do some billable hours
of research to find the true meaning, that is not a particularly regrettable flaw-
at least not to lawyers. Whether a non-lawyer can understand it is irrelevant.
Lawyers would be needed less, and there would be fewer of them, if a typical
American statute could be read and understood by any educated person. Law
drafters do not deliberately mystify. There is no conspiracy. It is merely a
centuries-old habit, unchanged because the people involved have no incentive to
change and no clear model for how to change.
Centuries-old habits are very hard to break. They have become hard-
wired into a culture. For example, consider this Article's title: Legislation's
Culture. It could have been The Culture of Legislation. English has two ways of
forming a possessive. One is to state the possessed thing first (The Culture),
followed by the preposition of, followed by the possessor (Legislation). This
resembles a passive construction even though no verb is involved. It is the French
method of forming a possessive-La culture de la lkgislation-and it entered the
English language when French and Middle English merged. As a passive
equivalent, it is boring and verbose. Lawyers love it. Of-possessive overuse is a
marker of legalistic writing. In a document written by a typical lawyer, it infects
nearly every sentence, or at least one sentence in every two.
The other method is to identify the possessor first, add an apostrophe and
an s, and then identify the thing possessed: Legislation's Culture. This comes
straight from Old English, which was a quasi-Scandinavian language. An s-
possessive is concise, and, like an active verb, can be vivid-someone or
something is in the act of possessing.
Ordinary people use either form, at whim, but mostly s-possessives.
Lawyers, however, use of-possessives at every opportunity, avoiding them only
where the result would seem ridiculous. They would not say "the little lamb of
170 MELLINKOFF, supra note 165, at 95-96.
171 Id. at 99.
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Mary," for example. In the Illinois statute in Appendix C, of-possessives occur
unnecessarily 46 times (plus a few instances where they truly are necessary).
That is one of several reasons why that statute is almost unreadable. (The most
important reason is that the Illinois statute uses too many concepts-which is
immediately apparent when compared with the French and Swedish statutes on
the same subject.)
Look at the Illinois statute's last section, section 9-3.3(a), which was
added after the rest of the statute had already been enacted:
A person who violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control
and Community Protection Act by unlawfully delivering a
controlled substance to another, and any person's death is
caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of
any amount of that controlled substance commits the offense of
drug-induced homicide. 174
You might be nodding off by the third line because of the two unnecessary of-
possessives.
That is part of the mystification in American legislation culture. But in
the fourth line an s-possessive unexpectedly appears-"person's death." To wear
out the reader, it should have been "the death of any person." We do not know
whether this s-possessive was an accident or deliberate. It does not really change
anything. After 46 unnecessary of-possessives together with so many other types
of legalisms, a lay reader would not have gotten this far anyway.
With some other rewriting, you might still be awake:
A person commits drug-induced homicide by delivering a
controlled substance to another person to violate the Illinois
Controlled Substances Act, § 401, or the Methamphetamine
Control ahd Community Protection Act, § 55, followed by a
person's death caused by exposure to any amount of that
controlled substance.
Two things make this rewrite understandable. One is converting the
possessives. The other is reducing the number of concepts. Four concepts in the
enacted statute ("by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of") were
replaced in the rewrite above by one concept ("by exposure to").
Law is filled with terms of art from Latin and Norman Law French that
mystified lay people centuries ago and still mystify them today. Some Latin
examples are amicus curiae, corpus delicti, de minimis, et al., exparte, informa
pauperis, inpersonam, in re, in rem, malum in se, mandamus, mens rea, quantum
meruit, res gestae, res ipsa loquitur, and respondeat superior. These all have
English equivalents, but lawyers use the Latin anyway. Some common French
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examples are battery, cause of action, covenant, decedent, devise, easement, lien,
promissory note, and tort.
Swedish law is entirely in Swedish. French law is entirely in French.
Only in English does linguistically foreign terminology mystify and alienate
people from their own law. "Though English is the official language" in the
United States, wrote David Mellinkoff, "the language of the law is not officially
English."'75
B. More History: Attempts at Subduing Judges
Rather than establishing national law through codes, William's
descendants did it by appointing judges to a national court and letting them figure
out what national law should be. Enacted law came much later, and until the 20th
century it was a stepchild. The processes and skill sets needed to write true codes
like the Code civil never developed. And common law courts historically viewed
legislatures as excitable amateurs apt to enact foolishness.'76
Legislatures in common law countries have had to use fussy, over-
conceptualized statute-drafting to subdue courts. Until legislatures expressly
forbade it, common law courts had a policy of narrowly construing statutes in
derogation of the common law. Although judges no longer treat legislators as
stepchildren, courts still behave sometimes like post-enactment shadow
legislatures, construing statutes to mean what the judges would have voted for if
they had been in the legislature themselves. This is not typical judicial behavior,
but there is a history to it, and it still happens often enough that legislatures feel
they need to control judges by fussing.
An example is the Supreme Court's sabotage of a statute enacted to
prevent discrimination against the disabled. The 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act 177 ("ADA") contains this definition:
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
178
175 MELLINKOFF, supra note 165, at 10.
176 For example, according to Frederick Pollack, 19th century English lawyers tended to believe
that "Parliament generally changes the law for the worse, and that the business of the judge is to
keep the mischief of its interference within the narrowest possible bounds." Hein K6tz, Taking
Civil Codes Less Seriously, 50 MOD. L. REv. 1, 10 (1987) (quoting FREDERICK POLLACK, ESSAYS
ON JURISPRUDENCE AND ETHICS 85 (1882)).
177 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (2012).
178 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
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The word or at the end of(B) makes this a three-alternative test. A person
is disabled if (A) or (B) or (C) is satisfied. Any one of them is enough.
Nevertheless, in three cases, the Supreme Court held that a person is not disabled
under the Act if medical treatment or other measures make it possible for that
person to live as nondisabled people do179-as though (A) must be satisfied in
virtually every ADA claim.
Employment discrimination against the disabled has two ingredients:
first, a disabled person is qualified to do the job, sometimes because medical
treatment or other measures mitigate the disability, and, -second, the employer
makes an adverse decision based on the disability even if it is mitigated. For
example, an epileptic who is seizure-free due to medication is qualified to drive
a truck, but an employer fires her because the employer dislikes epileptics. Under
the Supreme Court's Catch-22 logic, if the epilepsy is not mitigated, the epileptic
is not qualified for the job and therefore is not being discriminated against when
fired. If the epilepsy is mitigated, the epileptic is not disabled under the Act and
therefore is not being discriminated against in violation of the statute.18°
By standing an anti-discrimination statute on its head-and pretending
that Congress had not enacted (B) and (C)-the Court's ruling precluded, in this
common situation and others, the remedy the statute had been enacted to provide.
The Court did so even though committee reports in both the Senate and the House
specifically stated that (B) and (C) were in the statute to reach situations like the
epileptic's and other people whose disabilities had been mitigated.181
To rebuild what the Court had demolished, Congress had no choice but
to fuss by enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.182
A different method was used in France to subdue courts. Before the
French Revolution, courts could legally make law, and the law they made
179 Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), superseded by statute, Americans
with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008 ("ADAAA"), Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553
(2008); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999), superseded by statute,
ADAAA, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555
(1999), superseded by statute, ADAAA, Pub. L. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
180 From the novel Catch-22:
Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon
as he did, he would no longer be crazy and would have to fly more
missions.... If he flew them[,] he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he
didn't want to, he was sane and had to. Yossarian was moved very deeply by
the absolute simplicity of this clause of Catch-22 and let out a respectful
whistle.
"That's some catch, that Catch-22," he observed.
"It's the best there is," Doc Daneeka agreed.
JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22, at 52 (S&S Classic ed. 1999).
181 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-501 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 1,
at 28 (1990); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 22-24 (1989)).
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favored wealth and nobility. Napoleon Bonaparte commissioned codes in part to
reduce courts into subservience. Codification obliterated, at least formally, all
the law judges had made. Article 4 threatened judges with criminal prosecution
if they declined to adjudicate on a pretext of a code's "silence, obscurity, or
insufficiency."'183 From then on they obeyed and applied the codes, which,
through broadly general wording, destroyed almost all preceding law.
Karl Llewellyn was the guiding influence and principal drafter for
Articles 1 and 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.1 84 In a speech to the
Tennessee bar, he said,
You all have a hangover from law school; you feel that the
proper way to draw a statute is to mark it out as if it was written
for dumbbell judges whom you are trying to corral ....
The way to write good law is to indicate what you want to do,
and you assume within reason that the persons the law deals with
will try to be decent; then after that, you lay down the edges to
take care of the dirty guys and try to hold them in.
181
Llewellyn believed that most people, including judges, will do the right
thing if they are given enough information about the difference between right
and wrong. For most people, legislation succeeds by informing-by setting out
benchmarks in language everyone can understand. At "the edges," effective
legislation adds some consequences for the few "dirty guys." But most of a
statute's effectiveness is its appeal to the better parts of human nature.
This is the way European code drafters go about making law. Llewellyn
studied law in Germany and taught there,186 which is often dismissed as an odd
diversion in his youth. But it was much more than that. The experience
influenced him for the rest of his life. And as Part V(D) explains, it led to the
drafting methods for Articles 1 and 2, which are unique in American law.
183 See Crabb, supra note 7. "Le juge qui refusera de juger, sous pr~texte du silence, de
l'obscurit ou de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra 6trepoursuivi comme coupable de d~ni dejustice."
C. cIV. art. 4 (Fr.).
184 See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARv L. REv. 465 (1987).
185 Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 782 (1953).
186 See Michael Ansaldi, The German Llewellyn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 705 (1992); Herman, supra
note 28; James Whitman, Commercial Law and the American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn 's German
Sources for the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987).
[Vol. 119
48
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 11
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss1/11
LEGISLA TION'S CULTURE
C. The Field Codes
Inspired by the Code civil, the idea of a comprehensive code intrigued
many Americans in the mid-19th century.187 David Dudley Field wrote five
codes. 1 88 His civil procedure code merged law and equity and simplified pleading
(hence, "code pleading")189 and started a trend that ended in 1938 with adoption
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.190 Thirty states adopted Field's civil
procedure code or codes based on his code.1
91 Eighteen adopted his penal code.'92
Four'93 adopted all his codes: civil, civil procedure, penal, criminal procedure,
and political.194 These are not true codes in the European sense, for reasons
explained earlier in this Article. 9' But they are extraordinary intellectual
achievements.
Field wrote a fair portion of his codes in a declaratory style similar to the
Code civil and free of mystifying terminology. For example, from the California
version of Field's civil code, still law today: 1
96
§ 22. Law defined
Law is a solemn expression of the will of the supreme power
of the State. 197
Field was influenced by the Louisiana version of the Code civil. 198 In
Code civil-influenced codes, torts and contracts are not separate bodies of law.
187 Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY
ESSAYS 3, 9 (1949).
188 Field did not work in complete isolation. Other people participated at times on various
commissions. Id. at 9; Charles E. Clark, Code Pleading and Practice Today, in DAVID DUDLEY
FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS, supra note 187, at 55, 56; Alison Reppy, The Field Codification
Concept, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD: CENTENARY ESSAYS, supra note 187, at 17, 33, 39; Andrew P.
Morriss, Codification and Right Answers, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 355, 361 (1999).
189 Clark, supra note 188, at 55; Reppy, supra note 188, at 34.
190 Clark, supra note 188, at 55; Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
FederalRules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909,931-40 (1987).
191 Clark, supra note 188, at 55.
192 LUNDMARK, supra note 25, at 308.
193 Id. at 308-09 (referencing California, Montana, North Dakota, and South Dakota).
194 Id.
195 See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
196 It has been amended to address modem issues, though not more extensively than the Code
civil. For example: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a mother may breastfeed her child
in any location, public or private, except the private home or residence of another, where the mother
and child are otherwise authorized to be present." CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.3 (West 2016) (adopted
1997).
197 Id. § 22.
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They are both part of the law of obligations, and the only difference between
them is how the obligation is created: by agreement (contracts) or by operation
of law (torts). Contracts and torts are not taught separately in law schools in civil
code countries. They are taught together in a course usually called Obligations.199
Field drafted his civil code that way, providing general rules, such as conditions,
that govern all obligations,200 followed by rules unique to obligations created by
agreement2°1 and those unique to obligations created by operation of law20 2 and
those created by particular transactions.20 3 From Field's California Civil Code,
still law today:
§ 1434. Conditional obligation defined
An obligation is conditional, when the rights or duties of any
party thereto depend upon the occurrence of an uncertain
event.204
(Although Field drafted this way, California case law on contracts is entirely
separate from the case law on torts.)
199 Louisiana is a mixed jurisdiction in which common law and civil code law co-exist. At the
Louisiana State University Law Center, first-year students take common law Contracts and Torts
in the fall and a civil law course called Obligations in the spring. 2013-2014 LSU LAW CATALOG
29 (Paul. M. Herbert Law Center, La. St. Univ. ed., 2013). In the first-year fall semester, they also
take a required course in Legal Traditions and Systems. Here is the catalog course description:
This course will examine the impacts of the Roman civil law and the Anglo-
American common law, the two great legal cultures of the Western world, on
the Louisiana legal system. The course will first describe the distinctive
methodologies of the civil law and the common law and the historical contents
in which those methodologies emerged. It will then explore how these two
cultures have influenced Louisiana law. In particular, the latter portion of the
course will focus on the significance of merging a private law governed by a
civil code with public law and judicial institutions with Anglo-American roots
as well as the scope of content of Louisiana's Civil Code. To the extent time
permits, the course will also make appropriate comparisons with other
jurisdictions (e.g., Quebec and Puerto Rico) that have combined private law
governed by the civilian tradition and a public law with roots in the Anglo
tradition.
Id. at 29, 38-39.
200 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 1427-3272.9 (1872).
201 See, e.g., id. §§ 1549-1701.
202 See, e.g., id §§ 1708-1725.
203 See, e.g., id. §§ 1738-3273.
204 An uncertain event is one that might not happen. An obligation could be conditioned on
whether it rains next March 15. But it cannot be conditioned on sunrise that day. Sunrise can only
schedule the obligation (begin it or end it) unconditionally. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1434 (West 2016).
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D. The Uniform Commercial Code, Articles 1 and 2
Karl Llewellyn left his stamp especially on Articles 1 and 2. He believed
that commercial statutes should be free of unnecessary technicality so that the
rules would seem intuitive to ordinary business people.205 He got this insight as
a young part-time academic in the early 1920s when he tried to educate bank
clerks on the law governing their work and, in so doing, experienced their
frustration.20 6 When later he took a leadership role in development of the UCC,
Llewellyn devoted much effort to see that
[a]s far as possible the draftsmen treated businessmen, as well
as lawyers and judges, as the principal addressees of the Code.
An attempt was made to use concepts familiar to businessmen;
technical legal terms and complex clauses were avoided where
possible.... Where appropriate, too, sections dealing with
transactions were organized with the needs of lay participants in
mind. For example, § 2-502(2) presents the seller's duties in the
form of a catalogue of acts which the seller must perform, unless
otherwise agreed, and this can be read as a set of instructions
addressed directly to sellers.20 7
Llewellyn also wanted the UCC drafted for every lawyer, not just specialists. In
a speech to the Ohio State Bar Association, he said, "We are not trying to draw
it for the experts themselves; we are trying to draw it for the unilluminated,
ordinary guy of the bar [so] he can read our statute while he has trouble with the
other," meaning its predecessor, the Uniform Sales Act.20 8
The UCC includes extensive drafters' notes explaining what the words
of each section are meant to accomplish. When a state legislature enacts the
UCC, it unavoidably adopts the drafters' notes-just as a European legislature
enacts a statute with the meaning explained by the statute's travaux
prdparatoires.
Some parts of Articles 1 and 2 are admirable compressions of thought
and expression. Compare the UCC with the Code civil20 9 on the parties' duties in
goods sales.
205 WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 304 (1973).
206 Id.
207 Id. at 304-05.
208 Id. at 305, 335-36.
209 Both the UCC and the Code civil have provisions concerning the buyer's acceptance or
rejection of delivered goods. One of the Code civil provisions, article 1587, reflects not legislative
culture but instead national culture: "With regard to wine, oil and other things which it is customary
to taste before making purchase thereof, there is no sale so long as the buyer has not tasted and
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UCC Code civil
2-301. The obligation of Art. 1603. [The seller] has
the seller is to transfer and two principal obligations, that
deliver and that of the buyer is of delivering and that of
to accept and pay in guaranteeing2 1' that which he
accordance with the sells.
contract.21°  Art. 1650. The principal
obligation of the buyer is to pay
the price on the day and at the
place regulated by the sale.
Advantage Llewellyn.
Actually, it is not clear whether Llewellyn drafted these words or only
influenced them. In the long and convoluted story of how Article 2 came to be,
with so many ladles in the pot over years, we know only a little about who
contributed which words.212 But the difference between Article 2 and other
American legislation-even other UCC articles-is striking to anyone familiar
with European code drafting.
Here is another example:
§ 2-202. Final Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of
the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or
supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or
by course of performance (Section 2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the
court finds the writing to have been intended also as a complete
and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.213
210 U.C.C. § 2-301 (AM. LAW. INST. &UNIF. LAwCOMM'N 2012).
211 "The guaranty which the seller owes to the buyer has two objectives: the first is peaceful
possession of the thing sold; the second, hidden defects of such thing or vices of an annulling
character." C. civ. art. 1625 (Fr.).
212 Soia Mentschikoff, Reflections of a Drafter, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 539 (1982). For section
2-207, the one where the drafting has been most controversial, we know something but not as much
as we would like to. John D. Wladis, UCC Section 2-207: The Drafting History, 49 Bus. LAW.
1029 (1994).
213 U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2001).
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Packed into this one sentence are four rules that replace in goods sales everything
in the common law of parole evidence and extrinsic evidence.
1. Two things "may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior
agreement" (whether oral or written) "or of a contemporaneous oral agreement."
One is terms "set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression
of their agreement." The other is terms on which "the confirmatory memoranda
of the parties agree" (for situations where their agreement is expressed in more
than one writing).
2. A final expression of the parties' agreement or their confirmatory
memoranda "may be... supplemented.., by evidence of consistent additional
terms" (evidence that the parties agreed on additional terms) unless the parties
intended a writing to be "the complete and exclusive statement" of their
agreement.
3. A final expression of the parties' agreement or their confirmatory
memoranda "may be... supplemented" (new terms added) by evidence showing
course of dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance.
4. A final expression of the parties' agreement or their confirmatory
memoranda "may be explained" by extrinsic evidence showing course of
dealing, usage of trade, or course of performance.
E. There-Oughta-Be-a-Law Muddling
American law making can seem irrational and chaotic. Because
American legislation does not originate outside the legislature, there are no
preparatory materials. There is only legislative history, which can be subject to
manipulation and gives courts little guidance. Those who do the drafting-
legislative staff in Congress and the state legislatures-are skilled and
conscientious professionals who do the best they can. They have produced a
number of thoughtful manuals on statute drafting.214 But they work in a system
that makes well-crafted legislation unlikely.
American legislatures constantly tinker with statutes, adding and
subtracting whenever legislators become aroused by something that grabs their
attention. New York General Obligations Law section 9-103(a) is an example
(additions by amendment are italicized and underlined):
214 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OFF. OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL, HOUSE
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S MANUAL ON DRAFTING STYLE (1995),
http://legcounsel.house.gov/HOLC/Drafting-Legislation/draftstyle.pdf; LAWRENCE E. FILSON &
SANDRA L. STROKOFF, THE LEGISLATIVE DRAFTER'S DESK REFERENCE (2d ed. 2008); UNIFORM
LAW COMM'N, DRAFTING RULES (2012),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Publications/DraftingRules_2012.pdf; see also REED
DICKERSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING (1977); ROBERT E. KEETON, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING,
EDITING, AND INTERPRETING (2002); ARTHUR J. RYNEARSON, LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING STEP-BY-
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1963 - as enacted An owner, lessee or occupant of premises...
owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or
use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping, or
training of dogs.
as of 1972 An owner, lessee or occupant of premises...
- amended five owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or
times in nine years use by others for hunting, fishing, trapping, hiking.
horseback riding, bicycle riding, motorized vehicle
operation for recreational purposes, snowmobile
operation, or training of dogs.
as of 2014 An owner, lessee or occupant of premises...
- amended 13 owes no duty to keep the premises safe for entry or
times in 51 years use by others for hunting, fishing, organized
gleaning as defined in section seventy-one-yv of the
agriculture and markets law,215 canoeing. boating.
trapping, hiking, cross-country skiing, tobogganing,
sledding, speleological activities, horseback riding,
bicycle riding, hang gliding, motorized vehicle
operation for recreational purposes, snowmobile
operation, cutting or gathering of wood for non-
commercial purposes or training of dogs.216
It keeps growing and growing-and in the future will keep growing-
because of there-oughta-be-a-law legislating. Whenever a few legislators
become concerned about something, perhaps to satisfy constituent complaints or
interest-group lobbying, they get a bill written and sent to a committee, which
then might send it back to be tossed into a hopper for a floor vote. This is
amateurish, immediate-gratification legislating rather than making law for the
ages.
The problem, again, is not verbosity-too many words. It is lack of
clarity-too many concepts. If the legislature had enacted the following in 1963,
it would have gotten the section right the first time and need not have amended
it at all, not even once, during the half-century afterward. The words would have
been sturdy and enduring.
A premises owner, lessee, or occupant owes no duty to keep
the premises safe for entry or use by others for recreation, the
215 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 71-y (Consol. 2014) ("'Organized gleaning' means the harvest
of an agricultural crop that has been donated by an owner, lessee, or occupant of premises or
occupant of a farm by persons who are sponsored by a charitable not-for-profit organization.").
216 N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 9-103(a) (Consol. 2014).
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taking of wildlife, charitable agricultural work, or non-
commercial wood cutting or gathering.
Could anyone doubt that "the taking of wildlife" includes hunting,
fishing, and trapping? Or that "recreation" includes canoeing, boating, hiking,
cross-country skiing, tobogganing, sledding, speleological activities, horseback
riding, dog training, bicycle riding, hang gliding, "motorized vehicle operation
for recreational purposes," and snowmobiling? French or Swedish law-makers
would not have rushed a statute to satisfy constituent complaints. They would
have examined the problem as a whole, foreseen the issues that later occurred,
and chosen durable wording.
In tax law, Congress can outdo any state legislature. From 2000 through
2012-a mere 13 years-Congress made 4,680 changes to the Internal Revenue
Code.217
VI. AN EXAMPLE OF ROLE REVERSAL: ANTITRUST
Here is a comparison of the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act and the
corresponding provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU). Omitted are legislative findings and statements of purpose;
provisions allocating liability for damages or other relief, and enforcement and
procedural provisions, such as those authorizing lawsuits and prosecutions,
assigning venue, and setting burdens of proof. Reproduced below are only the
prohibitions, exceptions to prohibitions, and relevant definitions.
217 Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17
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Sherman Antitrust Act
15 U.S.C. § 1
Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 6a
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall
not apply to conduct involving trade
or commerce (other than import trade
or import commerce) with foreign
nations unless-
(1) such conduct has a direct,
substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect-
(A) on trade or commerce which
is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import
commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export
commerce with foreign nations, of a
person engaged in such trade or
commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim
under the provisions of sections 1 to
7 of this title, other than this section.
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to
such conduct only because of the
operation of paragraph (1)(B), then
sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply
to such conduct only for injury to
export business in the United States.
15 U.S.C. § 7
The word "person", or "persons",
wherever used in sections 1 to 7 of
this title shall be deemed to include
corporations and associations
existing under or authorized by the
laws of either the United States, the
laws of any of the Territories, the
Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union
Art. 101
1. The following shall be prohibited
as incompatible with the internal
market: all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect
trade between Member States and
which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the internal
market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix
purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production,
markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of
supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to
equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have
no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions
prohibited pursuant to this Article
shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1
may, however, be declared
inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of
agreements between undertakings,
- any decision or category of
decisions by associations of
undertakings,
- any concerted practice or
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laws of any State, or the laws of any
foreign country.
category of concerted
practices, which contributes to
improving the production or
distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or
economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings
concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of
these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the
possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the
products in question.
Art. 102
Any abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position
within the internal market or in a
substantial part of it shall be
prohibited as incompatible with the
internal market in so far as it may
affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, -in particular, consist
in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing
unfair purchase or selling prices or
other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or
technical development o the prejudice
of consumers;.
(c) applying dissimilar conditions
to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them
at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of
contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary
obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have
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TFEU articles 101 and 102 are fussier-more conceptualized-than 15
U.S.C. § 1, 6a, and 7. But on both sides, the provisions quoted above are just the
beginning.
The U.S. statute: Because there are no preparatory materials-nothing
like the French travaux pr~paratoires or the Swedish SOU process-members
of Congress had no idea what the statute meant when they enacted it. When
pressed to explain during floor debate what a combination in restraint of trade
would be, Senator Sherman admitted that he did not know. "All that we as
lawmakers can do is to declare general principles.218 That was in 1890. Since
then, a vast case law has grown up interpreting 15 U.S.C. § 1. The squibs alone
fill 596 pages in the hardbound West annotated U.S. Code and its 2014
paperbound pocket part.219 In a system without real preparatory materials, law-
making continues in the courts after enactment because courts have not been told
what the statute means. In this instance, even the senator who sponsored it, and
for whom it is named, did not know what it meant.
Congress subsequently added detail in the 1914 Clayton Antitrust Act
and later statutes, which regulated specific types of combinations in restraint of
trade and created exceptions such as the ones for labor unions,220 baseball,221 and
post-graduate medical residencies.222 Those later statutes total 4,983 words, not
counting recitals and remedies and enforcement provisions.223 Unlike the
Sherman Act, they are verbose and fussy.
The European Union treaty and regulations: The European Commission
out-fusses Congress by many miles. TFEU article 101(3) authorizes exemptions
to the article 101(1) prohibitions. The Treaty is the equivalent of the European
Union's constitution. European Union regulations perform a role similar to
statutes. The two regulations discussed below total 5,380 words, but the
complexity is not in the number of words. It is in the number of concepts and
their byzantine relationship to each other.
EU Regulation 330/2010 creates an exemption to the TFEU article
101 (1) prohibitions for:
vertical agreements entered into between an association of
undertakings and its members, or between such an association
218 21 CONG. REc. 2460 (1890),
http://www.appliedantitrust.com/02earlyjoundations/3sherman-act/cong-rec/2 lcong-rec2
455 2474.pdf; see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS 202 (2008
ed.).
219 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2 (West 2009 & Supp. 2014).
220 Walter L. Daykin, The Status of Unions Under Our Antitrust Laws, 11 LAB. L.J. 216, 217
(1960).
221 15 U.S.C. § 26b (1998).
222 Id. § 37b.
223 Id. §§ 12, 13, 13a, 13b, 14, 17, 18, 19, 26a, 26b, 37, 37a, 37b, 38.
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and its suppliers [but] only if all its members are retailers of
goods and if no individual member of the association, together
with its connected undertakings, has a total annual turnover
exceeding EUR 50 million,1
24
and that exemption applies if
the market share held by the supplier does not exceed 30% of
the relevant market on which it sells the contract goods or
services and the market share held by the buyer does not exceed
30% of the relevant market on which it purchases the contract
goods or services.225
The regulation also creates exceptions to this exemption.
And it creates exceptions to the exceptions to the exemption. For
example, the regulation's article 4(a) creates an exception to the exemption for
"vertical agreements which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination
with other factors under the control of the parties, have as their object ... the
restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its sale price," and it creates an
exception to the exception to the exemption for agreements that "do not amount
to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of pressure from, or incentives offered
by, any of the parties.226
Article 4(b) creates four separate exceptions to an exception to the
exemption from the TFEU article 101 (1) prohibitions.27
A different EU Regulation-772/2004-provides a separate exemption
to the TFEU article 101(1) prohibitions for technology transfer agreements as
well as exceptions to that exemption and exceptions to those exceptions.228
This is over-conceptualization on steroids. It is typical of EU drafting. It
conflicts with most member states' historic legislative cultures. And it seems to
grow out of distrust. EU legislation is enforced by the 28 member states'
domestic courts, which, the drafters seem to believe, will render inconsistent
decisions unless told exactly, in excruciating detail, what to do. But over-
conceptualization, once started, becomes uncontrollable, just as in the United
States. If EU Regulations 330/2010 and 772/2004 had been placed before
Portalis, Tronchet, de Pr~ameneu, and de Maleville at their table at
224 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 330/2010, art. 2, 2010 O.J. (L102) 4.
225 Id. at art. 3
226 Id. at art. 4(a).
227 Id. at art. 4(b).
228 Commission Regulation (EU) No. 772/2004, 2004 O.J. (L123) 11. This Regulation was
promulgated under Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), which
was identical to current TFEU Article 101. Regulations authorized by TEC provisions that have
been carried over into the TFEU are enforced as TFEU Regulations. Essentially TEC Article 81
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Fontainebleau, they probably would have asked whether it is truly necessary to
have exceptions to exceptions to exemptions. They would have pointed out that
true legislative genius is finding the simplest way to solve a problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
American trial judges complain about excessively conceptualized
statutes. Unnecessary complexity imposes costs on them with few rewards.
Appellate judges are in a better position to complain in published opinions. But
they complain little, and legislators rarely read appellate opinions anyway.
Lawyers have no reason to object. Clients pay them to unravel legislative
mysteries. And inside over-conceptualized statutes lurk arguments and loopholes
to be found and used in creative lawyering.
Voters are hurt because increased compliance costs are incorporated into
taxes and consumer prices, with ripple effects through the economy.
Legislation's culture, however, is too nuanced to become an election issue.
Legislators elected on end-big-government platforms change nothing.
Instead, through any legislation they vote for on any subject, they perpetuate
what they themselves are complaining about. They do not realize that the
problem is not big government. In a big, modem country, big government is
unavoidable. The problem is unnecessarily complicated government.
Perhaps American legislators should impose on themselves a standard,
sometimes heard in the sciences, that only after a researcher has been able to
explain something to a grandmother does the researcher eally understand it. This
is not a sexist thought. Because women have longer life expectancies, a
researcher is more likely to have a living grandmother than a living grandfather.
Whenever a bill is put before legislators, perhaps a small note should be attached
to every copy:
Please remember, as Portalis said, that the great art is to simplify
everything. Unless I can read and understand everything in this
bill, don't vote for it.
[signed] Your Grandmother
229
229 Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black believed that his opinions should be written so clearly
that "your momma" could understand them. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 325
(1994). Warren Buffett said, "When writing Berkshire Hathaway's annual report, I pretend that
I'm talking to my sisters. I have no trouble picturing them: Though highly intelligent, they are not
experts in accounting or finance." Warren E. Buffett, Preface, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
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The only solution to these problems is to change the way we and our
legislators think. The fault, as Cassius points out to Brutus, is not in our stars. It
is in ourselves.23°
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APPENDIX A
France: Code pinal on Homicide
231
(1999)
Art. 221-1. The willful killing of another is murder. It is punishable by thirty
years of felony imprisonment.
Art. 221-2. A murder which precedes, accompanies, or follows another felony
is punishable by felony imprisonment for life.
A murder which has for its purpose either to prepare or to facilitate a
misdemeanor, or to promote the escape or assure the immunity of the perpetrator
or an accessory thereto, is punishable by felony imprisonment for life.
The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 relating to the security period are
applicable to the offenses specified in this Article.
Art. 221-3. Murder committed with premeditation is an assassination. It is
punishable by felony imprisonment for life.
The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 relating to the security period are
applicable to the offense specified in this Article. However, when the victim is a
minor less than fifteen years of age and the assassination is preceded by rape,
torture, or barbarous acts, the assize court may, by a special decision, either raise
the security period to no more than thirty years or, if it imposes felony
imprisonment for life, decide that none of the measures enumerated in Article
132-23 will be granted to the convicted person; in case of commutation of the
penalty, and except if the decree of reprieve otherwise provides, the security
period is equal to the period of penalty resulting from the measure of reprieve.
Art. 221-4. Murder is punishable by felony imprisonment for life when it is
committed:
1. On a minor less than fifteen years of age;
2. On an ascendant, either legitimate or natural, or on a father or mother
by adoption;
3. On a person whose special vulnerability, due to age, sickness, infirmity,
physical or mental deficiency, or pregnancy, is apparent or known to the
perpetrator;
4. When the status of the victim is apparent or known to the perpetrator,
on a magistrate, juror, lawyer, public or ministerial officer, officer of the
gendarmerie, agent of the national police force, customs official, prison
administration official, or any other person exercising governmental authority or
entrusted with a mission in the public service, in the performance or on the
occasion of performing his or her duties or mission;
231 See supra note 8 for reasons for exclusion of provisions on abortion and on criminal
procedure. See supra note 7 regarding the translation.
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5. On a witness, victim, or civil party, either to prevent him or her from
exposing conduct, instituting a legal action, or presenting evidence, or because
of his or her disclosures, legal action, or evidence.
The first two paragraphs of Article 132-23 relating to the security period are
applicable to the offense specified in this Article. However, when the victim is a
minor less than fifteen years of age and the assassination is preceded by rape,
torture, or barbarous acts, the assize court may, by a special decision, either raise
the security period to no more than thirty years or, if it imposes felony
imprisonment for life, decide that none of the measures enumerated in Article
132-23 will be granted to the convicted person; in case of commutation of the
penalty, and except if the decree of reprieve otherwise provides, the security
period is equal to the period of penalty resulting from the measure of reprieve.
Art. 221-6.
Causing the death of another by carelessness, imprudence, inattention,
negligence, or the non-observance of an obligation of safety or prudence imposed
by law or regulation, is an unintentional homicide punishable by three years of
misdemeanor imprisonment and a fine of 300,000 francs.
In the case of deliberate non-observance of an obligation of safety or of
prudence imposed by law or regulation, the penalties incurred are raised to five
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APPENDIX B
Sweden: Brottsbalken on Homicide
232
(2014)
3:1 One who deprives another of life is to be sentenced for murder to
imprisonment for a fixed term, of at least ten and at most eighteen years, or, if
the circumstances are aggravated, for life.
3:2 If the crime referred to in section 3:1 is considered to be less grave, in
view of the circumstances that led to the act or for other reasons, imprisonment
for manslaughter is to be imposed for at least six and at most ten years.
3:3 A woman who kills her child at birth or at another time when, because of
the birth, she is in a distraught mental condition or deep distress, is to be
sentenced for infanticide to imprisonment for at most six years.
3:7 One who through carelessness causes another's death is to be sentenced
for negligent homicide to imprisonment for at most two years or, if the crime is
minor, to a fine.
If the crime is grave, the sentence is to be imprisonment for at least one and
at most six years. In determining whether the crime is grave, special
consideration is to be given to
1. whether the act included intentionally taking a serious risk or
2. whether the perpetrator, in a situation requiring special vigilance or skill,
was intoxicated by alcohol or another substance or otherwise made himself
responsible for negligence of a grievous nature.
3:10 If a crime referred to in sections 3:7-3:9 has been committed by
intentionally or carelessly breaching a duty to prevent illness or accidents under
the Workplace Environment Act, the perpetrator is to be sentenced for a
workplace environment crime to punishment as provided under the above-
mentioned law.
232 See supra note 8 for reasons for exclusion of provisions on abortion and on criminal
procedure. See supra note 7 regarding the translation.
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Illinois Compiled Statutes on Homicide
233
720 ILCS 5/9-1 to 5/9-3 (2014)
See. 9-1. First degree Murder - Death penalties - Exceptions False
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits
first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or
another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or
(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great
bodily harm to that individual or another; or
(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second
degree murder.
(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of
the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of
first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:
(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the
course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official
duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew
or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or
fireman; or
(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility
of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed
in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his
official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, or the murdered
individual was an inmate at such institution or facility and was killed on the
grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such
institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative
officer thereof; or
(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals
under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of
any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless
of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related
or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill
more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause
death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered
individual or another; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an
airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or
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(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement
or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return
for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money
or anything of value; or
(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if-
(a) the murdered individual:
(i) was actually killed by the defendant, or
(ii) received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant
substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more
persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-
2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the
other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the
death of the murdered individual; and
(b) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered
individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the
defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii)
of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the
defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the
knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm
to the murdered individual or another; and
(c) the other felony was an inherently violent crime or the attempt to
commit an inherently violent crime. In this subparagraph (c), "inherently violent
crime" includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated
kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated
stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion; or
(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death
resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty; or
(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the
murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation
or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or
prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed
the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or
gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either
against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8),
"participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution" is intended to include
those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or
(9) the defendant, while committing an offense punishable under Sections
401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of
the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, or while engaged in a conspiracy or
solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or
[Vol. 119
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counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of
the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution or facility of the
Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an
offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a
conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an
individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered individual; or
(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated
manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life
by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable
expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom; or
(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician-
ambulance, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency medical
technician-paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid
personnel, employed by a municipality or other governmental unit, killed in the
course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official
duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew
or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical
technician-ambulance, emergency medical technician-intermediate, emergency
medical technician-paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or
first aid personnel; or
(13) the defendant was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of a
calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of
authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the
defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional
killing of the murdered person; or
(14) the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. For
the purpose of this Section torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering
or agony of the victim; or
(15) the murder was committed as a result of the intentional discharge of
a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present
within the motor vehicle; or
(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or older and the death
resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton
cruelty; or
(17) the murdered individual was a disabled person and the defendant
knew or should have known that the murdered individual was disabled. For
purposes of this paragraph (17), "disabled person" means a person who suffers
from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an
injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person
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(18) the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a
community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity
as a community policing volunteer; or
(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order of protection and the
murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection
was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or
(20) the murdered individual was known by the defendant to be a teacher
or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is
upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of
a building used for school purposes; or
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in connection with or as
a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code.
(b-5) Aggravating Factor; Natural Life Imprisonment. A defendant who
has been found guilty of first degree murder and who at the time of the
commission of the offense had attained the age of 18 years or more may be
sentenced to natural life imprisonment if (i) the murdered individual was a
physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse,
(ii) the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was
a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse,
and (iii) the murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his or her
capacity as a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced
practice nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in
retaliation for his or her acting in that capacity.
(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation. The court shall
consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating
factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating
factors may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection
(b). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:
(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a
defense to prosecution;
(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal
conduct or consented to the homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the
imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;
(5) the defendant was not personally present during commission of the act
or acts causing death;
(6) the defendant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or
physical abuse;
(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity.
[(d) through (k) are omitted here because they're procedural]
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Sec. 9-2. Second degree murder.
(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murder when he or she
commits the offense of first degree murder as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) of
subsection (a) of Section 9-1 of this Code and either of the following mitigating
factors are present:
(1) at the time of the killing he or she is acting under a sudden and intense
passion resulting from serious provocation by the individual killed or another
whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he or she negligently or accidentally
causes the death of the individual killed; or
(2) at the time of the killing he or she believes the circumstances to be such
that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles
stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his or her belief is unreasonable.
(b) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in
a reasonable person.
(c) When evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined in subsection
(a) of this Section has been presented, the burden of proof is on the defendant to
prove either mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence before the
defendant can be found guilty of second degree murder. The burden of proof,
however, remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the
elements of first degree murder and, when appropriately raised, the absence of
circumstances at the time of the killing that would justify or exonerate the killing
under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code.
(d) Sentence. Second degree murder is a Class 1 felony.
Sec. 9-3. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide.
(a) A person who unintentionally kills an individual without lawful
justification commits involuntary manslaughter if his acts whether lawful or
unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great
bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases
in which the cause of the death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle or
operating a snowmobile, all-terrain vehicle, or watercraft, in which case the
person commits reckless homicide. A person commits reckless homicide if he or
she unintentionally kills an individual while driving a vehicle and using an
incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge approach, or hill, to cause




(1) Involuntary manslaughter is a Class 3 felony.
(2) Reckless homicide is a Class 3 felony.
(e) (Blank).
(e-2) Except as provided in subsection (e-3), in cases involving reckless
homicide in which the offense is committed upon a public thoroughfare where
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performing official duties, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if
sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than
3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e-3) In cases involving reckless homicide in which (i) the offense is
committed upon a public thoroughfare where children pass going to and from
school when a school crossing guard is performing official duties and (ii) the
defendant causes the deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of
conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a
term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 6 years and
not more than 28 years.
(e-5) (Blank).
(e-7) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e-8), in cases involving
reckless homicide in which the defendant: (1) was driving in a construction or
maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11-605.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code,
or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing to comply with any lawful
order or direction of any authorized police officer or traffic control aide engaged
in traffic control, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced
to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years
and not more than 14 years.
(e-8) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant caused the
deaths of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct and: (1) was
driving in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11-605.1 of
the Illinois Vehicle Code, or (2) was operating a vehicle while failing or refusing
to comply with any lawful order or direction of any authorized police officer or
traffic control aide engaged in traffic control, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for
which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a
term of not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e-9) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant drove a
vehicle and used an incline in a roadway, such as a railroad crossing, bridge
approach, or hill, to cause the vehicle to become airborne, and caused the deaths
of 2 or more persons as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class
2 felony.
(e-10) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter or reckless homicide
resulting in the death of a peace officer killed in the performance of his or her
duties as a peace officer, the penalty is a Class 2 felony.
(e- 11) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant
unintentionally kills an individual while driving in a posted school zone, as
defined in Section 11-605 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, while children are present
or in a construction or maintenance zone, as defined in Section 11-605.1 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code, when construction or maintenance workers are present the
trier of fact may infer that the defendant's actions were performed recklessly
where he or she was also either driving at a speed of more than 20 miles per hour
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(e-12) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e-13), in cases involving
reckless homicide in which the offense was committed as result of a violation of
subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the penalty is a
Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall
be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
(e-13) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the offense was
committed as result of a violation of subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of the
Illinois Vehicle Code and the defendant caused the deaths of 2 or more persons
as part of a single course of conduct, the penalty is a Class 2 felony, for which a
person, if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of
not less than 6 years and not more than 28 years.
(e-14) In cases involving reckless homicide in which the defendant
unintentionally kills an individual, the trier of fact may infer that the defendant's
actions were performed recklessly where he or she was also violating subsection
(c) of Section 11-907 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. The penalty for a reckless
homicide in which the driver also violated subsection (c) of Section 11-907 of
the Illinois Vehicle Code is a Class 2 felony, for which a person, if sentenced to
a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to a term of not less than 3 years and
not more than 14 years.
(f) In cases involving involuntary manslaughter in which the victim was a
family or household member as defined in paragraph (3) of Section 112A-3 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, the penalty shall be a Class 2 felony,
for which a person if sentenced to a term of imprisonment, shall be sentenced to
a term of not less than 3 years and not more than 14 years.
Sec. 9-3.3. Drug-induced homicide.
(a) A person who violates Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances
Act or Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection
Act by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to another, and any person's
death is caused by the injection, inhalation, absorption, or ingestion of any
amount of that controlled substance, commits the offense of drug-induced
homicide.
(b) Sentence. Drug-induced homicide is a Class X felony.
(c) A person who commits drug-induced homicide by violating subsection
(a) or subsection (c) of Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act or
Section 55 of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act
commits a Class X felony for which the defendant shall in addition to a sentence
authorized by law, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 15
years and not more than 30 years or an extended term of not less than 30 years
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